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In some contexts, an individual’s choice to mimic the behavior of others, to
join the herd, can increase systemic risk and retard the production of informa-
tion. Herding can thus produce negative externalities. And in such situations,
individuals by definition have insufficient incentives to separate from the herd.
But the traditional regulatory response to externality problems is to impose
across-the-board mandates. Command-and-control regulation tends to displace
one pooling equilibrium by moving behavior to a new, mandated pool. Mortgage
regulators, for example, might respond to an unregulated equilibrium where
most homeowners start with 2% down by imposing a requirement that causes
most homeowners instead to place 10% down. But this Article shows that society
can at times be better off if regulation induces separating behaviors by regulated
entities. We evaluate a variety of mechanisms including licenses, subsidies, and
regulatory variances as well as regulatory menus and heterogeneous altering
rules that can incentivize a limited number of regulated entities to take the path
less chosen. Anti-herding regulation provides a new means to attend to ways
that mimicry can both suppress the production of information and exacerbate
systemic risk.
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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a strong regulatory pull toward uniformity. It makes a bureau-
crat’s life easier if all firms fill out the same licensing form, and it is easier
for bureaucrats to monitor compliance if all licenses convey the same privi-
leges and obligations. One-size-fits-all regulation also comports with a na-
ı̈ve equal-protection norm of treating the public fairly. To be sure, the equal
protection principle calls upon government actors to treat dissimilar individ-
uals differently.1 But in this Article we will explore circumstances where the
government should treat similar people differently to discourage inefficient
pooling by private actors. Anti-herding regulation can produce two kinds of
benefits. First, anti-herding regulation can reduce the kinds of systemic risk
that occur when there is excessive behavioral uniformity. For example, if
virtually all homeowners (through low-downpayment first mortgages or eq-
uity-stripping second mortgages) have less than 5% equity in their homes,
then a 10% reduction in housing prices can lead to a destabilizing wave of
defaults. Second, anti-herding regulation can produce socially beneficial in-
formation. Inducing separating equilibria among the regulated can, for ex-
ample, avoid the inefficiency of informational cascades and help steer both
private and public actors toward better evidence-based outcomes. More
broadly, we argue that regulators should be attuned to systemic impacts of
regulatory pooling on the production of information and on the production of
systemic risk. Pooling is normally a good thing. Competitive markets pool
1 See generally Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1976).
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on a single price. Highways are safer if drivers choose to drive at the same
speed.2 But this Article delineates circumstances where regulation should
actively strive to induce behavioral diversity.
It is easy to see that mandatory rules induce pooling. Public health laws
force every child to receive the same vaccines prior to entering school. But
pooling equilibria is often a frequent byproduct of even regulatory regimes
that grant more autonomy to the regulated entities. Thus, for example, the
minimum reserve requirements give banks the option of retaining higher
cash reserves, but in the ordinary course of business many banks find it most
profitable to pool at the regulatory minimum. Indeed, the minimum reserve
likely induces more pooling than would occur in a world where banks indi-
vidually choose the percentage of deposits to keep on hand.3 Regulation can
thus not only mandate pooling, regulation can also subsidize pooling in the
sense of incentivizing regulated entities to opt for similar action.
But even seemingly neutral default rules may lead to socially inefficient
pooling. If you run a bank and you are deciding whether to herd with other
banks and invest a substantial proportion of your assets in mortgage-backed
CDOs, you are not incentivized to fully consider how your investment
choice will impact the default risk of other banks.4 To be sure, moving from
mandatory to default regulation will often induce more separation. Homes-
chooling produces more educational diversity than the lock-step uniformity
of the Soviet regime. And regulators should be attuned to whether their de-
fault regulations are producing sufficient diversity. Home mortgagors were
free to make larger downpayments, but in the early 2000s the majority of
borrowers chose to put down less than 5% heedless of how their individual
choices impacted the fragility of their neighbors’ investments. Whenever
there are positive externalities from separating equilibria, regulators should
be concerned that a laissez-faire market will underproduce separation.
Regulation is of course a natural response to the problem of negative
externalities. When my pollution hurts you, regulation naturally restricts my
right to omit effluents. But the standard regulatory response to externalities
is to impose mandated uniformity. The standard response moves behavior
from one pooling equilibrium (say, of pollution) to another pooling equilib-
rium (of non-pollution). But in some contexts, it is the pooling of behavior
that is itself the problem. A regulatory mandate that moves homeowners
from a pooling equilibrium of 1% downpayments to a pooling equilibrium of
5% does not solve the pooling problem. There is nothing socially deleterious
about a few homeowners having highly leveraged mortgages. Indeed, having
2 Highways are not, however, safer if all drivers choose to drive at the same time.
3 A similar kind of pooling at a regulatory minimum can be seen in how New York City
tenement design responded to the minimum light shaft requirements of the Tenement Housing
Act of 1879. See Alan S. Oser, Making Tenements Modern, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1999, availa-
ble at http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/04/realestate/making-tenements-modern.html.
4 Analogously, in choosing whether to follow the herd or to deviate, you are unlikely to
fully internalize the information benefits to society of being a maverick.
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a few low-equity mortgages might provide an early warning of problems in
the housing market. The problem is when a substantial proportion of home-
owners simultaneously choose to take out mortgages with high leverage.5
The challenge then for anti-herding regulation is to craft regulatory re-
gimes that proactively induce separation. The goal of this Article is not only
to theorize when anti-herding regulation is appropriate, but to suggest how it
might be feasibly implemented. A first step is to grant regulated entities
greater autonomy. Moving from mandatory rules to laissez-faire defaults at
times will be sufficient to diversify the behavior of regulated entities. Regu-
latory defaults, or default rules in regulatory regimes, can let a thousand
flowers bloom. This form of laissez-faire diversity can at times be enhanced
by non-transparency. Transparency that allows regulated entities to see how
other entities behave facilitates mimicry and leads to disabling informational
cascades. In such cases, Bayesian decision makers find it individually more
rational to mimic the tried-and-seemingly-true behavior of others rather than
to take the road less traveled. We will show that at times even mandated
non-transparency might produce better information or more diverse risk-
taking.6
Policies that expand autonomy promote separation by exploiting pre-
existing differences among the regulated—differences that lead them to
make different choices. But for reasons already discussed, the differences
among the regulated may not be sufficient to produce socially desirable sep-
aration. Anti-herding regulation must be ready to confront the harder prob-
lem of inducing similar entities to behave differently. To this end, we
suggest ways that government can incentivize limited amounts of deviation
from a pool by using combinations of carrots and sticks. Accordingly, we
develop the idea of limited licenses and regulatory variances that lift a regu-
latory burden for a subset of regulated entities. For example, the Treasury
might supplement the recent Dodd-Frank risk-retention rules for securitized
mortgages7 by auctioning a limited number of licenses freeing license-hold-
ing lenders from securitizing prohibitions. A limited number of tradable li-
censes can preserve ex ante equal protection while insuring ex post diversity
in regulatory burdens. Regulatory menus and heterogeneous altering rules
can produce analogous separating effects. Something as simple as putting
progressive surcharges on certain mortgage terms that tend to exacerbate
5 Indeed, a hallmark of many of the pooling problems described here is non-linearity of
the externality. The externality is exacerbated as the size of the pool increases. The first and
second derivatives of the externality with respect to the size of the pool are likely to be posi-
tive—at least for some policy-relevant levels of pooling.
6 Banks that do not know the portfolio decisions of their rivals will be unable to merely
mimic others’ investment decisions.
7 See Credit Risk Retention Final Rule (Oct. 23, 2014) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 43),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/boardmeetings/bcreg20141022a1.pdf.
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systemic risk8 can constrain excessive pooling on those terms without com-
pletely eliminating activity.
The remainder of this Article is divided into three parts. The next Part
sets out our theory of why anti-herding regulation can help constrain nega-
tive externalities with regard to both systemic risk and information produc-
tion. Part III explores anti-herding regulatory mechanisms (including
licensure and menus) to better promote separating equilibria. Part IV then
sketches how anti-herding regulation might be usefully applied in a variety
of contexts.
II. WHY INDUCE SEPARATING EQUILIBRIA? STABILITY AND INFORMATION
RATIONALES FOR ANTI-HERDING REGULATION
A. Pooling v. Separation in Contract Law
The concepts of “pooling” and “separating” equilibria describe the de-
gree of similarity and difference, respectively, between transaction terms or
outcomes across contracts.9 Terms include price, type of transaction, and
other non-price terms such as delivery requirements and payment structures.
Outcomes refer to the economic implications of an agreement, which may be
similar across agreements even if their terms differ in a technical sense.
To take a simple contracting example, if A buys wheat from B at two
dollars per bushel with a thirty-day delivery period, we would say that C and
D are “pooling” with A and B when C buys wheat from D at the same price
and delivery duration. Conversely, C and D are “separating” from A and B
when C agrees to buy wheat at five dollars per bushel with a fifteen-day
delivery period. However, even if C and D separate from A and B, other
contractors may pool with either or both of the pairs, resulting in multiple
“pools.”10 To obtain further separation, it is necessary for subsequent con-
tractors to transact at different combinations of price and delivery lengths.
Accordingly, the degree of pooling and separation depends on the distribu-
tion of terms across contracts. This can easily be visualized on the two
dimensions of price and delivery length:
8 See generally Ian Ayres & Joshua Mitts, Three Proposals for Regulating the Distribution
of Home Equity, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 77 (2014) (noting that interest-only, low-downpayment,
interest-reset terms exacerbate system risk relative to traditional fixed-rate amortizing loans).
9 As we discuss below, in the context of partial industry regulation, one can easily extend
the analysis of private contracting in this Article to decisions by administrative agencies to
enforce policy according to certain criteria. Indeed, individual decisions more generally can be
analyzed along a spectrum of cross-sectional similarity in terms of pooling and separation.
10 Contractors may also pool in response to government regulation by engaging in the
same type of transaction. For example, housing subsidies led to the popularity of subprime
mortgages.
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FIGURE 1: POOLING V. SEPARATING EQUILIBRIA































It is difficult to visualize additional dimensions, but the principle is the
same: separating equilibria reflect a dispersion of contracts across the spec-
trum of terms.
In a competitive market, it may not be possible to obtain a price lower
(or higher) than the competitive level. Even with perfect competition, how-
ever, contractors can often negotiate price in exchange for changes to other
terms—such as conditions of payment or delivery—and thereby separate. Of
course, each party obtains some subjective utility from a given combination
of terms. Presumably this utility exceeds the cost of contracting and per-
formance, or else the party would not have entered into the agreement. But
pooling and separation are defined with respect to contract terms in an exter-
nal, objective sense, considering the empirical distribution of contracting
terms across a sector, geographic region, or society as a whole. The focus of
our discussion is essentially regulatory: how should the law respond to the
collective effect of similarity in private contracting?
This question matters because the emergence of pooling and separating
equilibria can have profound implications for efficiency and, as we show
below, systemic stability and information acquisition. Indeed, the impor-
tance of this topic has been noted in the legal and economics literature. As
far back as 1973, Michael Spence showed that workers may signal compe-
tencies by choosing either to pool at the same level of education as other
workers or to separate by adopting different levels of education, depending
on the payoffs involved.11 Thereafter, the distinction between pooling and
separating equilibria played a significant role in game theory and the analy-
sis of strategic behavior.12
11 Michael Spence, Job Market Signaling, 87 Q. J. ECON. 355, 362–63 (1973); see also
MARTIN J. OSBORNE & ARIEL RUBINSTEIN, A COURSE IN GAME THEORY 238 (1994) (describ-
ing Spence’s signaling game and the resulting pooling and separating equilibria).
12 See, e.g., OSBORNE & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 11, at 238. R
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Law-and-economics scholars have since shown that “[r]estrictions on
freedom of contract” can “move the contractual equilibrium to more effi-
cient forms of contractual separation.”13 There are clear benefits to treating
different types of contractors differently, or getting different types to sepa-
rate, but in this Article we focus on getting similar types to separate. A key
insight is that inducing separation among otherwise similar contractors can
sometimes be more efficient than pooling.14
As we show in this Article, much of regulation actually produces pool-
ing. It is easy to see how mandatory rules produce pooling, but even default
rules can induce inefficient pooling if similar contractors ignore the social
benefits of separation or if the cost of altering the default is sufficiently
high.15 The importance of separation seems to contradict the premise of
much of the regulation of private economic activity. For example, much of
consumer protection law mandates disclosure of specific terms. Regulation
Z, which implements the Truth in Lending Act, prescribes in meticulous de-
tail a comprehensive list of terms that must be disclosed to borrowers.16 The
notion that different types of disclosure might apply to some borrowers and
not to others is foreign to the Truth-in-Lending regime. Or consider insider
trading. Rather than considering whether only certain actors should be sub-
ject to the prohibition on insider trading, the U.S. securities laws impose a
blanket prohibition on any trading on material, nonpublic information.17 In-
deed, the entire body of criminal law reflects a paradigm of inducing pooling
equilibria at non-commission of the prohibited conduct.18
We are not suggesting the lawmakers abandon prohibitory rules en-
tirely. Pooling is often socially beneficial. For example, scholars have noted
that mandatory rules in contract law—which necessarily induce pooling
equilibria—can prevent an “inefficient splintering of precedent that might
13 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice
of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729, 744 (1992).
14 Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite have argued that “partial-industry regulation”—where
government regulates only a subset of an industry—can reduce monopoly power. Ian Ayres &
John Braithwaite, Partial Industry Regulation: A Monopsony Standard for Consumer Protec-
tion, 80 CALIF. L. REV. 13, 1516 (1992) (finding that “purposefully treat[ing] firms in an
industry differently” can promote competition and suggesting benefits of separation in the
enforcement of regulatory policy); see also Ian Ayres, Responsive Regulation: A Co-Author’s
Appreciation, 7 REG. & GOV. 145, 146 (2013) (“In some contexts, regulators should intention-
ally strive for a separating equilibrium in which the regulated entities behave differently. A
regulatory goal to avoid pooling can naturally lead to new forms of partial-industry
regulation.”).
15 Penalty defaults might induce more separation than would majoritarian defaults. See Ian
Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of De-
fault Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 111–12 (1989).
16 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.1–226.59 (2012).
17 See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997); 17 C.F.R. § 240. 10b5-1
(2012).
18 In practice, of course, individuals still separate by committing crimes and paying the
price that the law imposes for their conduct if they are caught.
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take place under an enabling rule.”19 Pooling equilibria lead to greater pre-
dictability because contractors can rely on the prior experience of others who
have transacted on a given combination of price and non-price terms. The
prevalence of contracts of adhesion in the consumer setting likely reflects
the benefits of reducing variation in non-price terms and pooling contractors
at the competitive price level.
Nonetheless, too little separation can be costly. Commenting on Hadley
v. Baxendale,20 scholars have shown that a liability ceiling can induce “a
more efficient separating equilibrium (in which both high-value and low-
value shippers are served)” by “eliminat[ing] the carrier’s incentive to ig-
nore low-value shippers.”21 Similarly, a government policy of awarding con-
tracts to the lowest bidder can perpetuate racial discrimination by pooling
with non-minority contractors when “private suppliers (of, say, credit or
steel) systematically charge higher prices to minority firms.”22 Neutralizing
such discrimination requires inducing separation in awarding government
contracts, for example, by “estimat[ing] which firms would be available to
place winning bids in the absence of private discrimination and then . . .
award[ing] such firms bidding credits to recreate their ability to compete.”23
More recently, Ian Ayres and Joshua Mitts discussed the detrimental
effects of excessive pooling equilibria in the home mortgage market.24 They
showed that clustering of low levels of equity among homeowners in geo-
graphic areas can dramatically exacerbate the effect of natural downturns in
housing prices, leading to a feedback cycle of foreclosures and further fall-
ing prices.25 However, incentives to obtain a single level of minimum home
equity—even if higher than the 0% downpayments that characterized pre-
financial crisis mortgages—would also be detrimental.26 For example, a drop
of 10% in housing prices would push the same group of homeowners into
negative equity whether they were pooled at 2% or 8% equity. While pool-
ing all homeowners at high levels of equity (say, 20%) would reduce the
overall likelihood of foreclosure, this would have harmful distributive ef-
fects.27 A narrowly tailored approach to reducing systemic risk in the hous-
19 Ian Ayres, Making a Difference: The Contractual Contributions of Easterbrook and
Fischel, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 1391, 1405 n.30 (1992) (book review) (citing Jeffrey N. Gordon,
The Mandatory Structure of Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1549, 1565–66 (1989)).
20 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854). Hadley involved a suit for consequential damages over lost
profits while a mill could not operate due to the delayed delivery of a crankshaft.
21 Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 744. R
22 Ian Ayres & Fredrick E. Vars, When Does Private Discrimination Justify Affirmative
Action?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1577, 1640 (1998).
23 Id.
24 Ian Ayres & Joshua Mitts, Three Proposals for Regulating the Distribution of Home
Equity, 31 YALE J. ON REG. 77, 142 (2014).
25 Id. at 105.
26 Id. at 125–26.
27 See id. at 119–120.
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ing market requires moving from pooling to separating equilibria—altering
not only the average level of equity but also its distribution.28
In the following two sections, we expand on this principle of inducing
beneficial diversity in the distribution of contracting terms by discussing two
fundamental rationales for inducing separating equilibria: stability and infor-
mation. When discussing each, we show how regulatory intervention is justi-
fied to prevent social externalities.29 When private contractors choose to pool
with others, they impose costs on society that justify a regulatory response.30
B. Economic Stability and Survival
In a recent article, Ayres and Mitts argued that low-equity clustering
contributes to systemic risk by exposing proportionately more contractors to
negative equity as a result of downturns in housing prices.31 In this section,
we show more generally how “herding,” that is, excessive contractual pool-
ing equilibria, endangers economic stability, justifying regulation for the
sake of society as a whole.
1. Proportionate Exposure to a Fixed Shock
At a fundamental level, the existence of physical assets that permit
human survival implies that nearly every shock will necessarily be limited to
some subgroup of the population. Other than events that would lead to the
utter destruction of human civilization (for example, an asteroid impact or
climate change), the negative impact of any shock—no matter how severe—
will eventually be absorbed by humanity, leaving survivors to consume the
resources that remain. Of course, most economic crises have an impact that
is far less severe for wealthy societies—indeed, while the United States
emerged from the recent financial crisis with a reduced standard of living,
there were no large-scale famines or waves of disease that characterized
prior eras following financial crises.
Accordingly, from the standpoint of promoting stability, the key ques-
tion is where precisely the dividing line between the affected subgroup and
the remainder of society will fall. To take a concrete example from Ayres
and Mitts’s discussion of the recent financial crisis, the unknown variable
was the precise percentage that home prices would fall, such that all home-
owners below that level would be pushed into negative equity. More gener-
ally, we can define some cutoff c that represents this dividing line between
the affected and unaffected as a result of a crisis. Critically, the value of c is
28 See id. at 142.
29 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 15, at 88–89 (“[I]mmutable rules are justifiable if R
society wants to protect (1) parties within the contract, or (2) parties outside the contract.”).
30 They may also impose costs on themselves, which may not be fully internalized because
of psychological biases that encourage pooling even to one’s own detriment.
31 See Ayres & Mitts, supra note 24, at 90. R
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unknown prior to a crisis. Plotting two potential values of this cutoff on the
two prior graphs demonstrates the general danger that excessive pooling
equilibria pose:
FIGURE 2: THE EFFECT OF POTENTIAL SHOCKS ON POOLING
V. SEPARATING EQUILIBRIA































These graphs plot c = $3.00 and c = $4.50 as vertical lines, which can be
interpreted as a shock to buyers at that price level—for example, a sudden
post-acquisition drop in the price of wheat of $3.00 or $4.50, respectively.
While a shock at $3.00 seems to affect roughly the same number of buyers
whether pooled or separated, a drop of $4.50 subjects the entire group
pooled at $4.00 to the shock but only affects a smaller proportion of the
separated buyers. This is identical to the argument advanced recently by Ay-
res and Mitts: pooling at low levels of equity exposes proportionately more
homeowners to the risk of a sudden drop in home prices than if they were
more broadly dispersed among equity levels.
The notion that separating equilibria enhance systemic stability is not
limited to the idiosyncratic example we just gave. While we do not give a
rigorous mathematical proof in this paper, a few intuitions suggest the uni-
versal applicability of this principle. Modern portfolio theory holds that di-
versification of investments reduces idiosyncratic risk by spreading it across
assets that are less than perfectly positively correlated.32 The benefits of di-
versity derive from the fact that the potential outcomes of a given set of
contractual terms are unknown ex ante, which implies that each set of terms
has a probability distribution with a nonzero variance. As long as the returns
of different sets of terms are not perfectly positively correlated, diversity
reduces risk.
32 See generally EDWIN J. ELTON ET AL., MODERN PORTFOLIO THEORY AND INVESTMENT
ANALYSIS (Jennifer Manias et al. eds., 8th ed. 2009) (surveying the development of portfolio
theory).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\5-1\HLB102.txt unknown Seq: 11 18-FEB-15 11:06
2015] Anti-Herding Regulation 11
Indeed, there is a deep connection between the risk-reducing properties
of asset diversification and separating equilibria among contract terms. From
a societal perspective, the “returns” from a given set of contract terms re-
flect the externality of a transaction. Many types of failed transactions are
not merely zero-sum propositions where one party’s loss is the other’s gain
but rather impose costs on society as a whole. Indeed, the recent financial
crisis has shown that mass failure and economic instability are costly for
society. By distributing contracts across risk portfolios that are not perfectly
positively correlated (for example, identical contract terms), society gains
the benefit of diversification just like an individual who invests in uncorre-
lated assets. Some terms might fail but others will succeed, reducing the
overall variance of outcomes.
The importance of diversity and separation is not limited to financial
investments. In the following two subsections, we demonstrate how the ben-
efits of diversity are evident across a wide range of natural phenomena, from
agricultural ecosystems to genetic profiles. Separating equilibria can facili-
tate the emergence of stronger economic institutions that can withstand un-
expected shocks—and possibly even reverse the trend of increasing social
fragility that has facilitated repeated economic crises.
2. Biodiversity and Ecosystem Stability
A key tenant of our argument is that separating equilibria promote sta-
bility by spreading risk across a greater proportion of contract terms. In our
view, the benefits of diversity reflect a fundamental property of risk-readi-
ness that is evident across a number of fields, not only finance theory. Un-
derstanding the stability-enhancing properties of variation as they appear in
natural contexts can shed light on the importance of inducing separating
equilibria among contract terms. One prominent example is ecology, where
the benefits of diversity in the composition of biological ecosystems are well
known.
In 2005, a prominent ecological literature review summed up the stabil-
ity-enhancing aspects of variation in biological ecosystems:
If an ecosystem is subject to a variety of natural and human-caused
environmental stresses or disturbances, then having a diversity of
species that encompass a variety of functional response types
ought to reduce the likelihood of loss of all species capable of
performing particular ecological processes . . . In such cases, un-
stable individual populations stabilize properties of the ecosystem
as a whole.33
33 David U. Hooper et al., Effects of Biodiversity on Ecosystem Functioning: A Consensus
of Current Knowledge, 75 ECOL. MONOGRAPHS 3, 15 (2005) (citations omitted).
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Of particular interest for our claim regarding the benefit of diversity in the
contractual setting, the authors explicitly link the benefits of biodiversity to
financial portfolio theory: “[i]f species abundances are negatively corre-
lated or vary randomly and independently from one another, then overall
ecosystem properties are likely to vary less in more diverse communities
than in species-poor communities,” providing a “statistical averaging
[which] is similar to diversified stock portfolios.”34
The authors provide the following graphical depiction of the “simulated
stability of individual populations and a resulting community property
(summed abundances of individual species) illustrating the portfolio
effect:”35
FIGURE 3: THE STABILITY-ENHANCING EFFECT OF BIODIVERSITY
34 Id.
35 Id. at 16 (citing D.F. Doak et al., The Statistical Inevitability of Stability-Diversity Rela-
tionships in Community Ecology, 151 AM. NATURALIST 264 (1998); G. D.  Tilman, Biodivers-
ity: Population Versus Ecosystem Stability, 77 ECOLOGY 350 (1996); K.C. Cottingham et al.,
Biodiversity May Regulate the Temporal Variability of Ecological Systems, 4 ECOL. LETTERS
72 (2001)). The authors emphasize that the “decrease in aggregate variability with increasing
numbers of species results from the random fluctuations of the individual species. Underlying
assumptions that contribute to the degree of dampening include equal abundance of all species
and no correlation (r = 0) among species’ temporal dynamics.” Id.
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The figure demonstrates that as the number of different types of species in-
creases, the random variation of each species reduces the instability of the
overall community. This is precisely the theoretical justification for inducing
separating equilibria among contractual terms: society as a whole benefits
from reduced economic instability.
The benefits of biodiversity are not merely theoretical, however. Field
experiments have provided tentative empirical support for the proposition
that diversity enhances ecological stability.36 For example, “studies of
ecosystem recovery after disturbance have often found that ecosystems with
more rapid recovery (i.e., greater resilience) were those with a higher diver-
sity of response types[,] e.g., a mix of seeders and sprouters in the case of
fire.”37 Similarly, “[e]xperiments in microcosms and grasslands suggest
that increased species richness, either in terms of numbers of different func-
tional groups, or numbers of species within trophic functional groups, can
lead to decreased temporal variability in ecosystem properties.”38 In short,
the notion that separation promotes stability is supported by ample empirical
research in the ecological setting.
The importance of preserving biodiversity has served as the motivation
behind the worldwide effort to establish and maintain seed banks over the
last forty years. In 1972, the National Academy of Sciences issued a report
in response to the Southern corn leaf blight epidemic of 1970, warning that
“a decrease in genetic diversity [in agriculture] has accelerated since the
adoption of hybrid corn” from 1920–1970.39 The report led to the establish-
ment of the institution now known as Bioversity International, which ini-
tially coordinated efforts to promote the storage of crop diversity in seed
banks in the 1970s and now conducts research to preserve agricultural bi-
odiversity across the globe.40
The need to maintain sufficient separation has been widely acknowl-
edged in ecological and agricultural research but remains largely absent
from the economic paradigm underlying contract law and financial regula-
tion. The risk-readiness justification is identical across the two contexts,
however. Like biological systems, markets are subject to unexpected shocks,
which would have a lesser impact if spread across a variety of contractual
equilibria. Indeed, as we explain in the next subsection, the benefits of sepa-
rating equilibria derive from more fundamental properties such as the essen-
36 Id. at 17–19.
37 Id. at 17–18 (citing Sandra Lavorel, Ecological Diversity and Resilience of Mediterra-
nean Vegetation to Disturbance, 5 DIVERSITY & DISTRIBUTIONS 3 (1999)).
38 Id. at 19 (citing Jill McGrady-Steed et al., Biodiversity Regulates Ecosystem Predict-
ability, 390 NATURE 162 (1997); Shahid Naeem & Shibin Li, Biodiversity Enhances Ecosys-
tem Reliability, 390 NATURE 507 (1997); Mark C. Emmerson et al., Consistent Patterns and
the Idiosyncratic Effects of Biodiversity in Marine Ecosystems, 411 NATURE 73 (2001)).
39 NAT’L ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, GENETIC VULNERABILITY OF MAJOR CROPS 100 (1972).
40 History, BIOVERSITY INTERNATIONAL, http://www.bioversityinternational.org/about-us/
who-we-are/history/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
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tial role of genetic variation in population survival. These principles apply
with equal force to social and economic institutions.
3. Genetic Variation, Population Survival, and Fragility
In this subsection, we discuss the stability-enhancing properties of sep-
arating equilibria in two more settings. We begin with the genetics literature,
which provides insights into the importance of variation for the survival of
living organisms. We then discuss the connection between diversity and
preparedness in light of mathematical literature on risk, uncertainty, and
fragility.
At the biological level, the importance of diversity reaches far beyond
agricultural ecosystems. An extensive body of genetics literature has shown
that “[p]reservation of genetic diversity for disease resistance genes can be
of great importance for population survival,”41 particularly in natural animal
populations.42 Genetic diversity is essential for adaptability, the ability of
living organisms to respond to unexpected shocks and changes in environ-
mental conditions. The mechanism by which genetic variation enhances
adaptability is insightful for regulating separating equilibria in the contrac-
tual setting:
The adaptability of each individual to different environmental con-
ditions is restricted by the fact that its genetic variation cannot be
unlimited. This means that a population can only achieve its adapt-
ability by distribution of the variation across individuals. . . .
[T]he formation of a resistant but genetically uniform population
can imply increased susceptibility for new disturbances in the
environment.43
41 G. Booy et al., Genetic Diversity and the Survival of Populations, 2 PLANT BIOLOGY
379, 384 (2000) (citing Stephen J. O’Brien & James F. Evermann, Interactive Influence of
Infectious Disease and Genetic Diversity In Natural Populations, 3 TRENDS ECOLOGY &
EVOLUTION 254 (1988); Laura F. Hünneke, Ecological Implications of Genetic Variation In
Plant Populations, in GENETICS AND CONSERVATION OF RARE PLANTS 31 (Donald A. Falk &
Kent E. Holsinger, eds., 1991)).
42 Id. at 385 (citing David W. Coltman et al., Parasite-Mediated Selection Against Inbred
Soay Sheep in a Free-Living, Island Population, 53 EVOLUTION 1259 (1999); Stephen J.
O’Brien et al., Genetic Basis for Species Vulnerability in the Cheetah, 227 SCIENCE 1428
(1985); Stephen J. O’Brien, A Role for Molecular Genetics in Biological Conservation, 91
PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 5748 (1994)).
43 Id. at 385 (emphasis added) (citing Hans R. Gregorius, The Importance of Genetic Mul-
tiplicity for Tolerance of Atmospheric Pollution, in GENETIC EFFECTS OF AIR POLLUTANTS IN
FOREST TREE POPULATIONS 163 (Florian Scholz et al. eds., 1989); Piet J. Den Boer et al.,
Spreading the Risk of Extinction by Genetic Diversity in Populations of the Carabid Beetle
Pterostichus Oblongopunctatus F., 43 NETH. J. ZOOLOGY 242 (1993); Sheldon I. Guttman,
Population Genetic Structure and Ecotoxicology, 102 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 97 (1994); Glen
A. Fox, Tinkering With the Tinkerer: Pollution Versus Evolution, 103 ENVTL. HEALTH. PERSP.
93 (1995)).
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The italicized quoted text is of great importance for the regulation of con-
tractual equilibria. The need for genetic diversity derives from the inherently
limited nature of a single organism’s genetic variation. The ability of a popu-
lation to adapt to unexpected shocks depends on distribution of this variation
across different genetic profiles. This fundamental principle of variation in
the variation is essential to systemic stability and demonstrates why it is
paramount to ensure a sufficient level of separating equilibria. No matter
how robust a given contractual regime is to unexpected shocks, the profile of
risks to which a single regime may effectively respond is necessarily finite.
Enhancing systemic stability beyond the bounds of a single risk profile ne-
cessitates the distribution of varying terms across equilibria.
The importance of the distribution of variation is stated in terms of
probability theory by risk-management scholar Nassim Nicholas Taleb in his
writings on uncertainty and fragility.44 The technical term for the variation of
the variance of a probability distribution is kurtosis, also known as its fourth
moment.45 Kurtosis essentially refers to the degree of “fatness” of the tails
of a probability distribution—the extent to which overall returns are derived
from extreme rather than ordinary events. For example, a high-kurtosis dis-
tribution might have a negative expected value (the weighted average of all
payoffs is less than zero) but nonetheless is characterized by positive returns
ninety-nine percent of the time. This could occur if the rare outcome has
such a large negative payoff that it outweighs the positive outcomes exper-
ienced most of the time.
4. Diversity as Insurance for Unknown Conditional Probability
In the prior Part, we discussed the stability-enhancing benefits of sepa-
rating equilibria in the statistical terms of preparing for a high-kurtosis, un-
expected shock. But behavioral diversity can also produce an insurance
advantage that makes systems more resilient.
To take a stylized example, consider the battle of Stalingrad in World
War II. The Soviets succeeded in repelling the Nazi invasion, in part because
Stalin was able to quickly draft and mobilize over one million Russian
men.46 It seems likely that the totalitarian nature of his dictatorial regime was
at least partially responsible for his success in amassing his forces with such
speed. As this battle proved to be a turning point in the war against Hitler,47
it seems that the dictatorial ideology of communism was at least partially
44 See generally NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE
HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2010); NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN
FROM DISORDER (2012).
45 See generally Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Fat Tails and (Anti)fragility: Lectures on
Probability, Risk, and Decisions in The Real World (2013), available at https://docs.google
.com/file/d/0B_31K_MP92hURjZxTkxUTFZnMVk/edit?pli=1.
46 See John Simkin, Stalingrad, SPARTACUS EDUCATIONAL, http://www.spartacus.school
net.co.uk/RUSstalingrad.htm (last visited June 20, 2013) (collecting primary sources).
47 Cf. id.
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responsible for halting the momentum of Hitler’s genocidal regime. The
world was potentially more resilient because Nazi invaders were forced to
confront a diversity of economic systems—liberal capitalistic systems which
are more productive but slow to mobilize, as well as totalitarian systems
which are less productive but faster to mobilize. If we stylistically denote the
world’s payoffs by f(y), it might be true:
but
Even though the payoffs to the world are generally better in non-mixed eco-
nomic systems where all countries are capitalistic democracies,48 when con-
fronted with a Nazi threat, the payoffs are higher when countries are
governed by mixed liberal and totalitarian regimes.49
Crucially, we are not suggesting that the unconditional payoffs of
mixed liberal-totalitarian regimes exceed those of liberalism, i.e., fMixed(y) >
fLiberalism(y). Our point is merely that in some states of the world, mixed re-
gimes may produce higher payoffs than in a world with only liberal democ-
racies. To use another analogy, we do not know which will ensure the
survival of the human race if the Martians land one day. The future of civili-
zation may hinge on retaining sufficient diversity of economic and political
systems so as to ensure that a high enough conditional payoff remains.
The subject of this Article is the legal regulation of private behavior,
not existential threats to humankind. But the principle is equally applicable
to transaction terms. A particular form of economic activity may have little
benefit today but have a substantial payoff to society in the future. Consider,
for example, greenhouse gas emissions. Even though the current level of
emissions is highly detrimental to society by contributing to climate
change,50 gasoline cars may provide great utility at some point in the future.
The key insight of our argument is that some level of seemingly detrimental
activity today might be highly valuable under conditions that are presently
unknown.
A similar diversity-as-insurance idea underlies proposals for “partial
industry regulation.”51 Industries with regulated prices can face the risk of
48 See IMMANUEL KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE: A PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH (1795).
49 The presence of Stalin’s totalitarian regime, however, may have facilitated the Nazi
threat (for example with the signing of the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact), but conditional
on World War II having begun, the rest of the world might have been safer with mixed
regimes.
50 See, e.g., David Biello, How Much Is Too Much?: Estimating Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/limits-on-greenhouse-
gas-emissions/ (Apr. 29, 2009).
51 See supra note 13.
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regulatory capture—where the regulator induces supra-compensatory pric-
ing. Industries without price regulation may be more susceptible to collu-
sion. But an industry that applies price regulation to only a subset of
producers might more resiliently avoid the risk of the worst outcomes that
might be produced by either pure system. The regulated portion might pro-
vide competitive pressure against private collusion, and the unregulated
firms might ameliorate the risk of deadweight loss when regulators become
captured by the interests of the regulated.52
C. Information and Experimentation
The second fundamental justification for separating equilibria is infor-
mational in nature: diversity permits learning of better outcomes in alterna-
tive states of the world. In the following subsections, we explore the
informational benefits of separating equilibria through the theoretical lenses
of informational cascades. Depriving society of these informational benefits
is a type of externality that justifies regulatory intervention. We conclude
with a few examples of this informational rationale in law and practice
today.
We previously emphasized the stability-enhancing benefits of prepared-
ness for such unexpected shocks, but there is an informational payoff as
well. Society not only obtains the benefit of the better-performing behavior
in the conditional state, but is also enriched by learning that such a payoff
exists. In the Stalingrad example, retaining some level of a totalitarian ideol-
ogy might have not only prevented Hitler from conquering Europe, but also
might have given humanity more information about the relative performance
of different political and economic systems in the face of an unusual type of
stress. This process of learning and discovery reflects a form of comparative
experimentation, whereby the conditional payoffs of differing behaviors are
allowed to unfold in parallel.
This experimentalist rationale is similar to the argument scholars have
advanced in advocating for explicit randomized testing of law and regula-
tion.53 Experiments that randomly assign different regulatory regimes to dif-
ferent entities can produce causal information about the impact of different
rules.54 Randomized assignment is indeed a kind of anti-herding regulation,
because exposing otherwise similar entities to different regulations can pro-
mote separating private behaviors. Separating equilibria in private behaviors
can analogously provide regulators and lawmakers with the variation that
52 See Ian Ayres, Responsive Regulation: A Co-Author’s Appreciation, 7 REG. & GOV.
145, 146 (2013) (“In some contexts, regulators should intentionally strive for a separating
equilibrium in which the regulated entities behave differently. A regulatory goal to avoid pool-
ing can naturally lead to new forms of partial-industry regulation.”).
53 See Michael Abramowicz, Ian Ayres & Yair Listokin, Randomizing Law, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 929 (2011).
54 See id. at 939.
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can help support evidence-based inferences about legal impacts. In this
sense, separating equilibria complement randomization: the latter facilitates
causal inference while the former expands society’s knowledge regarding the
covariance of potential outcomes with varying types of contractual
equilibria.
1. Informational Cascades
In two well-known articles, Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer,
and Ivo Welch demonstrated the threat to the accumulation of knowledge
resulting from an “informational cascade.”55 The key insight behind an in-
formational cascade is to distinguish between the ability to observe the sig-
nals of other individuals as opposed to merely their actions in a setting of
sequential decision-making.56 A signal is an individual’s subjective
probability regarding the payoff of a particular action, transaction, or con-
tractual term. Observing predecessors’ signals (not merely their actions)
leads to the accumulation of more accurate information regarding the payoff
over time.
To take a simple example, imagine that B is unsure how beneficial a
zero-downpayment mortgage actually is, because she is unsure whether the
upfront cash savings will outweigh the greater monthly payment. She
knows, however, that A has just taken a zero-downpayment mortgage for his
home. If B can observe not only A’s action of taking the zero-downpayment
mortgage, but also A’s signal—whether A subjectively believes it was a
good idea—B can update her own belief based on A’s signal and thereby
make a decision with greater information.
This insight can be shown formally by using the rule of probability
known as Bayes’ Rule, which utilizes the concept of “posterior” probability:
a probability that is more informative or “updated” in light of observed data.
This rule states that posterior probability is proportional to the prior
probability without observing the data multiplied by the likelihood that the
observed data would occur under the prior belief. In algebraic terms,
P(B⏐A) ∝ P(B)P(A⏐B).57 If this formula looks familiar, it is because
Bayes’ Rule utilizes the concept of conditional probability we discussed in
the prior section—which in this case is interpreted as subjective belief con-
ditional upon observing certain information.
In the prior example, this means that B’s updated belief regarding the
desirability of a zero-downpayment mortgage (P(B⏐A)) is proportional to
55 Sushil Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Fads, Fashion, Cus-
tom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. ECON. 992 (1992); Sushil
Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, Learning from the Behavior of Others: Con-
formity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151 (1998).
56 See Bikhchandani, David Hirshleifer & Ivo Welch, Learning from the Behavior of
Others: Conformity, Fads, and Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151, 153 (1998).
57 This is presented in terms of proportionality rather than equality because we have omit-
ted the normalization term P(A) in the denominator.
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her prior belief (P(B)) multiplied by the likelihood that A’s experience would
occur given her prior belief (P(A⏐B)). The key insight for the theory of
informational cascades is that P(A⏐B) is only known when B can observe
A’s signals, that is, his subjective probability P(A) regarding the payoff of
the activity. Put differently, the notion of information acquisition through
Bayesian updating depends on knowing the likelihood function. Updating
subjective beliefs in light of another’s beliefs necessarily implies observing
those beliefs.
However, if B can only observe A’s actions rather than his signal, Bikh-
chandani et al. show that B will rationally update her beliefs in light of A’s
actions, but this quickly leads to no additional accumulation of information
regarding the underlying payoff.58 To take a simple example, if B observes
that A takes the mortgage, B will either take the mortgage if her prior belief
is that the mortgage is beneficial—because A’s action implies similarly—or
remain indifferent between taking the mortgage if her prior belief is that it is
not—because she knows only her negative prior belief and A’s positive ac-
tion. If she is indifferent, she flips a coin.
The key insight is that an informational cascade begins with the next
actor, C.59 If C observes that A and B took the zero-downpayment mortgage,
C will do so regardless of his prior belief. This is because even if he thinks
the mortgage is a bad idea, he infers from A and B’s conduct that it is more
likely than not to be beneficial. A’s action implies a positive payoff and B’s
action either implies a positive payoff or indifference. As long as C ascribes
some nonzero probability to the positive payoff possibility, A and B’s com-
bined actions imply that a positive payoff is more likely than not.
In short, while C was indifferent between taking the mortgage when he
had a negative prior belief and only observed A, observing B makes it
wholly rational to take the mortgage by tilting the probability that the mort-
gage is a good decision slightly above fifty percent. The same rationale ap-
plies to subsequent actors, all of whom are “stuck” in an informational
cascade whereby it is entirely rational to infer the value of an unknown event
from the actions of predecessors when their signals are unobservable.60
An informational cascade is essentially a series of pooling equilibria.
Rather than transacting on different terms—even terms which may have a
higher payoff—subsequent contractors end up pooling on the same terms
because of the informational disparity resulting from the inability to observe
predecessors’ private signals. Crucially, pooling within an informational cas-
cade is wholly rational: subsequent parties are simply maximizing utility
under significant informational constraints by rationally relying on others’
58 See id. at 153.
59 Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others, supra note 56, at 154. R
60 If B’s coin flip led her not to take the mortgage, A and B’s probabilities offset each
other, leading C to make his decision solely on the basis of private information. C would thus
take A’s place in the cascade, and the sequence would begin again. See id. at 155.
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\5-1\HLB102.txt unknown Seq: 20 18-FEB-15 11:06
20 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 5
prior experience. Yet they are doing so ignoring the expected social benefit
of providing information on out-of-equilibrium behavior.61
In this sense, regulatory intervention to “break up” informational cas-
cades by inducing separating equilibria reduces the externality of an infor-
mational market failure. By forcing separation, regulators compel
subsequent contractors to make a decision based on information other than
probabilistic inference from similar transaction terms, bringing society the
benefit of better-informed decisions. This intervention might counteract the
precedential benefits of pooling equilibria,62 but it is difficult to know when
relying on precedent will lead to efficient cost reduction as opposed to igno-
rance-promoting informational cascades. Our argument is not that regulators
should prohibit pooling equilibria entirely, but that some separating is desir-
able to prevent the dangers of excessive pooling equilibria, of which infor-
mational cascades are but one example. In this case, separation benefits
society as a whole by increasing information regarding more socially effi-
cient alternatives in the present and future.63
2. Examples
We are not the first to notice the informational benefits of separating
equilibria. Indeed, there are several examples in law and practice today. Per-
haps the most well-known is the justification for federalism given by Justice
Brandeis in 1932:
It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single
courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory;
and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the
rest of the country.64
Similarly, Roberta Romano has referred to federalism as the “genius of
American corporate law,”65 which has led to much literature considering
whether such experimentation and competition among states in fact produces
a “race to the top” in corporate governance.66
61 In addition to depriving society of information regarding the unknown future payoffs of
certain contractual equilibria, informational cascades prevent contractors from learning of bet-
ter alternatives that might be presently available.
62 See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 18, at 1405 n.30 (discussing the potential for an “inef-
ficient splintering of precedent that might take place under an enabling rule”).
63 This may also benefit parties to the contract by forcing them to take a risk and possibly
discover an alternative set of transaction terms that are more beneficial.
64 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
65 ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1 (1993).
66 See, e.g., Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor
State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775 (2002); Michael Abramowicz,
Speeding Up the Crawl to the Top, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 139 (2003); Lucian Arye Bebchuk &
Assaf Hamdani, Vigorous Race or Leisurely Walk: Reconsidering the Competition Over Cor-
porate Charters, 112 YALE L.J. 553 (2002); William W. Bratton, Corporate Law’s Race to
Nowhere in Particular, 44 U. TORONTO L.J. 401 (1994).
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We return to this topic in our discussion of inducing separating equilib-
ria in corporate law in Part IV.C below, but in our view, experimentation can
provide much more information than whether, in a binary manner, one type
of contractual equilibria has a higher payoff on average than another. The
parallel execution of differing contractual terms permits discovering not only
which terms are more effective on average, but also whether some (for ex-
ample, unknown conditional future payoffs) are more effective under differ-
ent conditions such as locations and even time.
A practical example of the benefits of retaining separation despite evi-
dence as to the average superiority of one method over another is Google
AdWords’ Quality Score positioning system. As Google explains, the Qual-
ity Score is based on  the relevance of your keywords, the quality of your
landing page, your ad’s clickthrough rate (CTR), adjusted for its position on
the page, and a few other factors “expected clickthrough rate, ad relevance,
and landing page experience.”67 The clickthrough rate is “[a] ratio showing
how often people who see your ad end up clicking it.”68
The use of the clickthrough rate in Google’s Quality Score algorithm
implies that ads that are more popular are more likely to be clicked. How-
ever, the clickthrough rate is just one of several factors, and even those ads
that have a relatively low clickthrough rate are still likely to appear from
time to time. Google retains separation in its Quality Score algorithm; the
purpose is not to determine, as a binary matter, which ads are better than
others so that these may be retained and all others eliminated. Rather,
Google’s algorithm implicitly recognizes that the effectiveness of ads may
change over time, different users are likely to be affected by ads dissimi-
larly, and the popularity of an ad is just one measure that is relevant to the
ad’s placement determination. This thinking reflects an understanding of the
informational benefits of separation: were Google to exclusively prefer those
that are highest-performing, advertisers would be deprived of knowledge re-
garding the conditional effectiveness of other ads.
Indeed, we suggest that the informational benefits of favoring separa-
tion have profound ethical implications as well. Consider, for example, the
practice of halting pharmaceutical drug trials when it becomes apparent that
one drug is more effective than another. A prostate cancer drug trial was
recently halted “to give all patients a chance to receive the life-extending
medication.”69 The problem with such an approach, in our view, is that it
deprives society of conditional knowledge that might be of great importance.
What if the medication that seems highly effective today kills all of its users
67 How Adwords Works, GOOGLE ADWORDS, http://support.google.com/adwords/answer/
2497976?hl=en&ref_topic=2642398 (last visited Oct. 5, 2014)
68 Clickthrough Rate (CTR), GOOGLE ADWORDS, https://support.google.com/adwords/
answer/2615875?hl=en (last visited Oct. 5, 2014)
69 Victoria Colliver, Prostate Cancer Drug So Effective Trial Stopped, S.F. CHRONICLE,
June 2, 2012, available at http://www.sfgate.com/health/article/Prostate-cancer-drug-so-effec
tive-trial-stopped-3603973.php.
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one year from now? The paradigm of pooling at what seems effective to-
day—reducing diversity in favor of binary choices—deprives society of the
knowledge regarding payoffs conditional on the future or even differing cir-
cumstances in the present.
In the following Part, we show how regulators may intervene to induce
separation to preserve both the stability-enhancing and informational bene-
fits of diversity in contractual equilibria.
III. THREE WAYS TO INDUCE SEPARATION
In this Part, we discuss three mechanisms by which regulators may in-
duce separating equilibria in private contracting: direct manipulation of in-
centives through licensing and subsidies, menus, and heterogeneously
impeding altering rules.
A. Carrots and Sticks: Direct Manipulation of Incentives Through
Licensing and Subsidies
In a recent article, Ian Ayres and Joshua Mitts proposed a system of
leverage licenses to induce separation in the distribution of home equity.70
Licenses have been widely favored as the instrument of choice to regulate
environmental externalities such as carbon emissions,71 and scholars have
proposed licensing regimes for fields as diverse as patent rights,72 energy
credits,73 and hunting rights.74 The advantages of licensing over traditional
“command-and-control” regulation (i.e., simply prohibiting certain conduct)
are closely related to the rationales for inducing separating equilibria that we
have outlined: there are substantial advantages to allowing some quantity of
a beneficial phenomenon with undesirable side effects rather than outlawing
it entirely.
Such “partial” regulation typically has been justified under the theory
that the socially efficient level of an activity is less than would otherwise
result without regulation but nonetheless nonzero. Initially, economists pro-
posed intervention in the form of a Pigouvian tax, a simple surcharge on
transactions that reduced output to the socially efficient level.75 Subsequent
70 Ayres & Mitts, supra note 24, at 7. R
71 See, e.g., T. H. Titenberg, Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation, 6 OX-
FORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 17, 30 (1990).
72 Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STANFORD L. REV. 863,
883 (2007).
73 David Berry, The Market for Tradable Renewable Energy Credits, 42 ECOLOGICAL
ECON. 369, 370 (2002).
74 Douglas MacMillan, Tradeable Hunting Obligations—A New Approach to Regulating
Red Deer Numbers in the Scottish Highlands?, 71 J. ENVTL. MGMT. 261, 266 (2004).
75 See, e.g., ARTHUR PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1932); William J. Baumol &
Wallace E. Oates, The Use of Standards and Prices for Protection of the Environment, 73
SWEDISH J. ECON. 42, 42 (1971).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\5-1\HLB102.txt unknown Seq: 23 18-FEB-15 11:06
2015] Anti-Herding Regulation 23
research demonstrated, however, that tradable permits—restrictions on the
permissible quantity of an activity—were often superior to price mecha-
nisms.76 Yet they are functionally identical: in economist Marty Weitzmann’s
words, “in principle exactly the same information is needed to correctly
specify either.”77 Building on this principle, Ian Ayres has suggested an in-
termediate approach consisting of Pigouvian taxes that increase with
quantity.78
However, while licenses and Pigouvian taxes are equally effective at
reducing output to a socially efficient level, they are not equally certain to
lead to separating equilibria and the resulting stability and informational
benefits that we described in Part II of this Article. As Ayres and Mitts
explain, Pigouvian taxes expose regulators to the risk that the quantity of
takers will be unexpectedly high. If regulators set the Pigouvian price of
borrowing with zero equity at $2000, there would be some risk that millions
of borrowers would pay the price, and that the economy would again be
exposed to the needless systemic risk caused by low-equity bunching.79
More generally, taxes lead to separating equilibria only under certain
assumptions regarding contractors’ demand curves. Licensing, on the other
hand, directly permits or prohibits the emergence of specified quantity levels
of different sets of transaction terms. This property of a licensing system
leads Ayres and Mitts to propose a system of leverage licensing whereby
lenders must have a license to originate or service mortgages at given equity
levels.80 For example, by permitting only a certain quantity of loans at less
than 5% equity and 5–10% equity, regulators can directly facilitate separa-
tion in the leverage terms of mortgage transactions.81
We suggest that licensing regimes can similarly facilitate the emergence
of separating equilibria more generally. We discuss applications of this prin-
ciple in detail in Part IV below, but in general, it is conceptually straightfor-
ward to extend the principle of licensing a limited number of transactions
with a different set of contractual terms to other contexts such as banking
and securities regulation. Just as with Ayres and Mitts’s proposal for mort-
gage equity regulation, these licenses could be tradable, ensuring that they
gravitate to their highest-valued use.82
76 E.g., J. H. DALES, POLLUTION, PROPERTY AND PRICES (1968); Martin L. Weitzman,
Prices vs. Quantities, 41 REV. ECON. STUD. 477 (1974). But see Robert N. Stavins, Transaction
Costs and Tradeable Permits, 29 J. ENVIRON. ECON. & MGMT. 133 (1995) (emphasizing trans-
action costs of tradable permits).
77 Weitzman, supra note 76, at 478. But see Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 R
COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1531 (1984) (“[B]ehavior is more elastic with respect to prices than
sanctions.”).
78 Ian Ayres, Narrow Tailoring, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1781, 1808–09 (1996) (proposing a
declining-credit schedule for minority bidders on procurement contracts that trades off quan-
tity for the size of the subsidy).
79 Ayres & Mitts, supra note 23, at 127–28.
80 See id. at 82.
81 Id. at 91.
82 See id. at 122.
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Licensing, however, is not the only way to directly manipulate incen-
tives to achieve separating equilibria. Sometimes it is helpful to pair the
“stick” of regulatory prohibitions with the “carrot” of subsidies and pay-
ments for the desired conduct.83 A complementary approach to requiring li-
censes to limit pooling equilibria, therefore, would be to subsidize the
emergence of diversity in contracting terms. For example, regulators could
issue variances to encourage transactions on terms other than those that are
common in the marketplace. In the context of mortgage equity, regulators
might, for example, offer a substantial tax incentive for mortgages with
5–10% equity, were they to observe significant pooling at the 0–5% level.
An example of targeted subsidies is Ayres and Mitts’s proposal to insti-
tute variation in the “conforming mortgage” definition utilized by Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac.84 They suggest permitting the government-sponsored
enterprise (GSE) to “incentivize beneficially varying conformity by simply
setting the price they are willing to offer for mortgage products at each
level.”85 By offering different prices for mortgages at different equity levels,
the GSEs would induce beneficial separation in the distribution of equity.
Varying subsidies can effectively complement the direct quantity restrictions
that are imposed by a licensing scheme.
Under current law, regulatory variances are sometimes proposed to ac-
complish public policy goals—for example, with kidney transplantation.86
Differentiating regulatory treatment through the use of targeted variances
could induce separation. A similar idea is that of discretionary enforce-
ment—regulators could choose to enforce laws differentially for otherwise
similarly situated contractors. In Part IV, we discuss how regulators could
induce separation in the composition of bank balance sheets by imposing
differential transparency requirements, reducing systemic risk by preventing
financial institutions from mimicking each other’s asset holdings.
More generally, one can imagine incorporating a “pro-diversity” policy
into every form of economic regulation. As we explained in Part II, diversity
in the distribution of contractual terms provides stability-enhancing and in-
formational benefits. These benefits are often substantial in magnitude but
nonetheless conditional in various ways that may not be readily apparent in
an expected-value comparison of different terms. Accordingly, regulators
might adopt policies that subsidize diversity for its own sake. For example,
regulators might provide for special grants or loan guarantees for types of
businesses, private market structures, or ideologies that are different, regard-
less of an agency’s estimation of their respective likelihoods of success. As
83 See generally IAN AYRES, CARROTS AND STICKS: UNLOCK THE POWER OF INCENTIVES
TO GET THINGS DONE (2010) (discussing incentives and anti-incentives).
84 Ayres & Mitts, supra note 23, at 139.
85 Id. at 139.
86 See, e.g., KIDNEY TRANSPLANTATION COMMITTEE, PROPOSAL TO SUBSTANTIALLY RE-
VISE THE NATIONAL KIDNEY ALLOCATION SYSTEM (2012), available at http://optn.transplant
.hrsa.gov/PublicComment/pubcommentPropSub_311.pdf.
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we have repeatedly emphasized, any estimation of future success is always
conditional on today’s information. Accordingly, a policy of inducing diver-
sity serves society (and parties to the contract) by increasing the likelihood
that some particular set of contract terms will have a very high conditional
payoff that cannot be anticipated today. We return to this point when dis-
cussing concrete applications in Part IV.
B. Menus
Legal menus are another way to reduce externalities by inducing sepa-
ration.87 The core of our anti-herding proposal is the notion that similar ac-
tors should be treated differently or induced to behave differently. As with
licenses and subsidies, menus can reduce the externalities of excessive pool-
ing by inducing more separation than would exist with merely the option of
contracting around a traditional default.
A menu is the communication of at least two simultaneous offers.88 An
example of a contractual menu from everyday life is the document commu-
nicating the food offerings at a restaurant, where a customer may choose one
or more of the enumerated meal choices or nothing at all.89 If the offeree
does not accept one of the listed options, no contract is formed. Yair Listokin
has shown empirically that statutory menus matter in state corporate law:
Georgia has expressly provided by statute for fair price protection in busi-
ness combinations, whereas Delaware has done so only by judicial prece-
dent; specifically, Listokin found that 57% of Georgia corporations opted in
to fair price protection compared to 20% in states lacking a statutory menu.90
Listokin has also shown that there is variation more generally in the “menu”
of antitakeover protections that state corporate law offers to firms.91
Menus that simultaneously offer a higher-price, lower-regulation alter-
native and a lower-price, higher-regulation alternative can induce regulated
entities to separate themselves based on whether the lower regulation is
worth the cost of the higher price. Thus, some incorporating entities in Dela-
ware choose the lower-price close corporation form while others opt for the
higher-price, more responsive standard corporate form.92 Varying the qual-
87 See generally Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3, 3–4 (2006) (calling for
scholars and lawmakers to “move beyond the bad old days, when market interventionists only
had the simplistic tools of a ‘tort head’—who, like linguistically challenged parrots, could only
ritualistically repeat ‘prohibit it’ or ‘mandate it’”). We wish to thank Patrick Hayden for stimu-
lating our thinking in this area.
88 Id. at 3.
89 See id.
90 Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical Exami-
nation, 6 J. EMP. L. STUD. 279, 295 (2009).
91 See Yair Listokin, If You Give Shareholders Power, Do They Use It? An Empirical
Analysis, 166 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 38, 39 (2010).
92 See Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L. Q.
365, 376–77 (1992) (discussing substantial differences in cost between close and public incor-
poration in Delaware).
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ity-price mixture (or varying two quality dimensions of a regulation) can
deter herding behavior. Indeed, the self-separating effect of menus is quite
analogous to the mortgage license regime described above, except in this
case the government rather than the market would choose the menu prices—
simultaneously offering the option to issue mortgages with less leverage for
lower license prices.
Menus combined with clearly communicated altering rules can facili-
tate separation by reducing the cost of contracting around the default to a
privately higher-valued alternative.93 More generally, menus can induce sep-
arating equilibria whenever the cost of individualized negotiations for an
alternative set of terms exceeds the cost of contracting under the menu. A
survey by Kelley Blue Book found, for example, that fifty-nine percent of
American consumers “hate” negotiating over the price of a new car.94 Such
a strong dislike for haggling is likely to lead to pooling at the suggested
retail price or a non-negotiated discount from it. One could imagine giving
consumers a menu of three to five combinations of price and financing
terms. Choosing from this menu would likely have a much lower psycholog-
ical cost than conducting open-ended negotiations, as is presently the case.
In short, a regulatory mandate for a lower-cost “opt-out” procedure,
such as a menu, encourages contractors, for whom negotiation is costly, to
separate rather than pool at the default rule or terms offered by the offeror.
We discuss specific examples in which regulators might induce efficient sep-
aration by offering a menu of choices in Part IV. But first, it is worth consid-
ering how the cost-reducing properties of menus extend to procedural rules
of contracting more generally, which we explain in the following section.
C. Heterogeneous Impeding Altering Rules
A third way to induce separation is a generalization of the insights we
developed with regard to menus, and consists of employing heterogeneously
impeding altering rules. As Ian Ayres has explained, “Altering rules are the
necessary and sufficient conditions for displacing a default legal treatment
with some particular other legal treatment.”95 Ayres describes one particular
type known as an “impeding” altering rule, which imposes a cost on con-
93 Scholars have shown how separating menus can promote efficiency by reducing alter-
ing costs for offerors, using the facts of Hadley v. Baxendale as an example: “When high-type
valuations are intermediate [compared to low-type ones], carriers will offer separating
menus—because the gains from discriminating between the high and low types is now greater
than are the costs of contracting.” Ayres & Gertner, supra note 13, at 751. In this example, R
menus induce separation by giving offerors a low-cost mechanism to contract with offerees
with a lower valuation that is private information, eliminating the dilemma between excluding
these offerees entirely or engaging in prohibitively costly individualized negotiations.
94 Graphic: Do Americans Like Buying Cars?, KELLEY BLUE BOOK: THE TRUSTED RE-
SOURCE (Aug. 3, 2011), http://www.kbb.com/car-news/all-the-latest/graphic-do-americans-
like-buying-cars/.
95 Ian Ayres, Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theory of Altering Rules, 121 YALE L.J.
2032, 2036 (2012).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\5-1\HLB102.txt unknown Seq: 27 18-FEB-15 11:06
2015] Anti-Herding Regulation 27
tractors who wish to opt-out of the default rule (for example, by charging a
fee for opt-out or mandating the performance of a time-consuming proce-
dure to effectuate the opt-out):
Concerns with negative externalities or (hard) paternalism can also
at times motivate lawmakers to implement altering rules that seek
to impede some contractors from opting out . . . . They are quasi-
mandatory rules that attempt to produce a constrained separating
equilibrium, allowing a reduced number of contractors to opt for
legal consequences that lawmakers disfavor. . . . Heterogeneity . . .
can produce contexts where it is efficient to erect impeding barri-
ers that disproportionately allow default displacement where there
are higher private benefits, lower negative externalities, or lower
paternalism concerns.96
Ayres shows that an impeding altering rule can promote efficiency when it
“deter[s] some contractors from contracting around the default.”97 This re-
sult is driven by heterogeneity in the gains and negative externalities from
altering; given a sufficiently large difference in gains between different
types of contractors and a sufficiently small difference in the negative exter-
nalities, an impeding altering rule is more efficient than a default or
mandatory rule when it encourages some contractors, who have large gains,
to opt-out and others, who have only small gains, to remain with the de-
fault.98 This could occur, for example, if lawmakers set the cost of opt-out
above the gains from altering for the latter group but below that of the
former.
In this straightforward example, an impeding altering rule can induce
separation given a certain distribution of gains and costs of opting out. We
suggest that this intuition can be extended to situations that deviate from this
assumed distribution among contractors. The key insight is that impeding
altering rules can be more efficient than simple default or mandatory rules,
even among homogeneously distributed contractors, as long as the rules are
heterogeneously impeding. Ayres’s model does not require that the gains and
costs of opt-out be solely a function of contractors’ private valuations.
Through a sufficiently sophisticated altering rule, it is possible to render the
mechanism of opt-out more or less costly or beneficial for parties regardless
of heterogeneity in the payoffs from the underlying substantive “opted-into”
rule.
Why differentially impose costs or gains on parties who would other-
wise benefit equally from a uniform rule (whether default or mandatory)? As
we showed in Part II, there are strong externality justifications for inducing
separating equilibria by regulation. As a hypothetical example of cost impo-
96 Id. at 2086–88.
97 Id. at 2089 (emphasis added).
98 See id. at 2089–90.
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sition through heterogeneously impeding altering rules, consider Ayres and
Mitts’s proposal to regulate the distribution of equity in the mortgage mar-
ket.99 Instead of a licensing scheme, one could imagine regulators requiring a
significantly more burdensome application procedure for loans at levels of
equity that were experiencing bunching. Potential homeowners wishing to
obtain a mortgage at 5% equity might be required to undergo a lengthy on-
line training course, whereas only a simple signature would be required for
8% equity. Such a heterogeneously impeding altering rule could effectively
induce separation in the distribution of equity even if the gains and losses
from opting out were identically distributed, for example, if all homeowners
prefer a lower downpayment over a higher one.100
The capacity of heterogeneously impeding altering rules to induce sepa-
rating equilibria is not limited to the differential imposition of additional
costs on similarly situated contractors. It is also possible to induce separation
by heterogeneously reducing the costs of contracting for specific terms.
Such an approach would be particularly effective if there were a baseline
cost inherent in the negotiation setting. This often occurs in situations of
bilateral monopoly, “thin markets” where the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation renders unstructured negotiations costly and protracted.101 In these
settings, scholars have typically advocated for liability rules, such as by forc-
ing judicial sales to cash out the entitlement rather than compel costly bilat-
eral negotiations.102
Recently, Steven Brams and Joshua Mitts demonstrated that the princi-
ple of mechanism design can guide regulatory intervention to reduce trans-
action costs in bilateral monopolies with asymmetric information.103 They
99 Ayres & Mitts, supra note 23, at 122.
100 However, this particular altering rule might require homogeneity to obtain an optimal
result. If the gains and costs from engaging in the opt-out procedure are heterogeneously dis-
tributed, such an altering rule might not have the desired effect. Regulators could apply the
procedure at random to try to neutralize selection effects, but if the distribution of costs and
benefits correlates with the undesirable equity level, then a homogeneously impeding altering
rule (for example, one that simply imposes a fixed cost of altering on every contractor, along
the lines of Ayres’s example) might be preferred to one that is heterogeneously impeding.
101 See IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 20 (2005)
(“[W]hile contracts may serve as a fine paradigmatic example, the option approach is a pow-
erful way to analyze any bilateral monopoly situation—that is any situation where there are
two (or a small number of) people who ‘are stuck with each other.’”) (quoting Carol M. Rose,
The Shadow of the Cathedral, 106 YALE L.J. 2175, 2183 (1997) (“Ayres and Talley are inter-
ested in situations in which two parties are stuck with each other, thin markets instead of
‘thick’ ones. Neighboring landowners seem to fit that bill.”)).
102 See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitle-
ment to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1032 (1995); Louis Kaplow & Steven
Shavell, Do Liability Rules Facilitate Bargaining? A Reply to Ayres and Talley, 105 YALE L.J.
221, 223–24 (1995); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Distinguishing Between Consensual and Non-
consensual Advantages of Liability Rules, 105 YALE L.J. 235, 249 (1995); Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109 HARV. L.
REV. 713, 735 (1996).
103 See Steven J. Brams & Joshua R. Mitts, Law and Mechanism Design: Procedures to
Induce Honest Bargaining, 68 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 729, 743,789 (2013) (quoting Royal
Swedish Academy of Sciences, Press Release: The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sci-
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propose altering rules consisting of algorithmic procedures that restructure
incentives in the negotiation process to facilitate agreement instead of en-
gaging in protracted and costly unstructured negotiation. Specifically, Brams
and Mitts discuss two procedures—the Bonus Procedure and Two-Stage
Procedure—that render the honest disclosure of reservation prices a weakly
dominant strategy.104 In the former, a third party (for example, a regulatory
agency) grants the parties a bonus equal to half the difference between their
offers, which renders it impossible for each party to do better than bidding
its reservation price.105 In the latter, negotiations are conducted in two stages,
where parties first submit reservation prices to determine if a transaction is
possible and then submit binding offers thereafter. When specific al-
gorithmic procedures are followed, it can be proven that honest disclosure of
reservation prices in the first stage is a weakly dominant strategy.106
The presence of high-cost unstructured negotiations in the absence of a
bargaining procedure renders bilateral monopoly scenarios well suited for
algorithmic altering rules. These rules heterogeneously reduce the cost of
contracting in order to induce separating equilibria. There is no reason why
algorithmic altering rules should be universally applied to all types of con-
tractors in every situation. Indeed, regulators can utilize these procedures
selectively to induce separating equilibria that provide the stability-enhanc-
ing and informational benefits we discussed in Part II.
IV. APPLICATIONS
In this Part, we apply our theory of inducing separating equilibria to
three regulatory settings: banking, consumer finance, and corporate and se-
curities law. We show how a regulatory policy of encouraging separation can
provide specific informational and stability-enhancing benefits in each of
these fields.
A. Banking & Financial Institutions
1. Herding as Source of Systemic Risk
Our discussion of the stability-enhancing properties of separating equi-
libria has focused on the risk posed by a high number of individuals pooling
at the same contractual terms. Ayres and Mitts, for example, emphasize the
ences in Memory of Alfred Nobel (Oct. 15, 2007), http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/
economics/laureates/2007/press.html (awarding the Nobel Prize in Economics to three scholars
for “having laid the foundations of mechanism design theory,” which addresses “the optimal
mechanism to reach a certain goal, such as social welfare or private profit” in “transactions
[that] do not take place in open markets but within firms, in bargaining between individuals or
interest groups and under a host of other institutional arrangements”)).
104 Id. at 750, 753.
105 The proof is given in id. at 761–62 .
106 See id. at 753, 756–57.
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potential for low-equity clustering to transform a slight downturn in housing
prices in a geographic region into a cascade of negative equity, foreclosure,
and further falling prices.107 But a similar vulnerability is present when there
is excessive clustering among the balance sheets of a relatively small num-
ber of banks and financial institutions.
In a recent paper, Joshua Mitts described this phenomenon as a type of
systemic risk to the financial system that was effectively exploited in the
crisis of 2008 to 2009.108 Building on work by Viral Acharya109 and Richard
Squire,110 Mitts identified three forms of systemic risk as (1) mutual expo-
sure of financial institutions to an asset class with correlated returns condi-
tional on an unexpected shock, (2) direct counterparty exposure by firms to
each other, such that the insolvency of one can induce the insolvency of the
other, and (3) short-term illiquidity resulting from a crisis of confidence
among creditors—for example, a classic “run on the bank.”111 Mitts argued
that the statutory limitation on government recapitalization of failed firms
renders the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC) resolution pow-
ers under the Dodd-Frank Orderly Liquidation Authority (OLA) effective at
responding to the third type of systemic risk—short-term illiquidity—but
not the first two types, in which conditional synchronization of asset returns
leads to balance-sheet insolvency.112 The presence of such correlation en-
ables firms to strategically compel a government bailout.
To see how this vulnerability operates, compare a sequence of financial
institution failures caused by liquidity shortfalls to one caused by insol-
vency. In the former case, the failure of a financial institution due to deposi-
tors or other creditors rushing to withdraw assets or demand repayment may
be halted or contained as long as there is a lender of last resort.113 As long as
the institution is fundamentally solvent, it would be rational for a lender to
supply emergency, short-term credit collateralized or otherwise indirectly
guaranteed by these assets. In practice this often occurs through debtor-in-
possession financing in bankruptcy proceedings for nonbank financial
firms.114
107 See Ayres & Mitts, supra note 23, at 77.
108 Joshua Mitts, Systemic Risk and Managerial Incentives in the Dodd-Frank Orderly
Liquidation Authority (Feb. 18, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2220208.
109 Viral V. Acharya, A Theory Of Systemic Risk and Design of Prudential Bank Regula-
tion, 5 J. FIN. STABILITY 224 (2009) (finding systemic risk is “the endogenously chosen corre-
lation of returns on assets held by banks”).
110 Richard Squire, Clearinghouses as Liquidity Partitioning, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 857
(2014).
111 Mitts, supra note 104, at 11.
112 Id. at 12.
113 See generally Mark A. Carlson and David C. Wheelock, The Lender of Last Resort:
Lessons from the Fed’s First 100 Years (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, Working Paper No.
2012-056B, 2013) (discussing the Federal Reserve’s traditional role as lender of last resort).
114 Banks were traditionally subject to a unique FDIC resolution scheme because the fail-
ure to repay depositors often leads to a crippling crisis of confidence that leads to irreversible
reputational damage.
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Of course, when conditions in the credit markets render a market solu-
tion impracticable, it is essential to empower a regulatory agency to step in
and prevent a firm from inefficiently closing its doors due to mere illiquid-
ity. Under the OLA, the FDIC has broad authority to extend emergency
credit to firms it places in resolution.115 This regime is well suited to prevent
the next crisis of creditor confidence; as long as the proximate cause of an
institution’s troubles is illiquidity, the FDIC has the tools to intervene and
serve as a lender of last resort.
However, if the cause of an institution’s failure is insolvency resulting
from common bets on poorly performing assets or interconnected exposures
in the financial sector, an effective resolution is much more complex. Often,
the value of the underlying assets held by these firms is depressed due to
broader macroeconomic conditions or substantial uncertainty regarding ex-
pected future returns in a particular economic sector (for example, housing).
When depressed asset prices are unlikely to recover in the short term, it
would be foolish for the private market to extend credit, since a new creditor
would only be diluting its pro rata recovery in any insolvency proceeding.116
The ordinary approach to an insolvent firm is to compel it to enter
bankruptcy, where creditors will recover cents on the dollar. But if a firm is
systemically important, by definition forcing creditors to take a loss would
undermine the stability of the financial system. With the “common bets”
type of systemic risk, a forced sale would signal a valuation to the market
that would likely push other financial institutions holding the common assets
into insolvency as well. And in the “interconnected exposure” case, forcing
other financial institutions to take cents on the dollar would significantly
reduce the asset side of their balance sheets.
Accordingly, when conditionally correlated firms are facing insol-
vency-driven failure, the only solution is a bailout, in other words, recapitali-
zation in one form or another. Either private investors or government
regulators must infuse failing firms with equity capital directly or remove
the problematic assets off their balance sheets. This is precisely what the
highly unpopular Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) did in 2008.117 De-
115 See supra note 104, at 24 (citing 12 U.S.C. § 5390(n), (o) (2013) (providing for the
orderly liquidation fund and assessments on financial companies with over $50 billion in
assets)).
116 Admittedly, it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between illiquidity and insolvency
because liquidity crises can spiral into insolvency crises as a result of fire sales that depress
asset prices. In these cases, the lender of last resort may be improperly used, for instance, if the
lender does not realize that the assets of the institution to which it is extending credit have
declined in value. But liquidity shortages can be prevented effectively with the existing regula-
tory scheme established by the OLA, which facilitates the supply of emergency credit to troub-
led firms. The OLA, therefore, eliminates the need to conduct fire sales and needlessly depress
asset prices. Accordingly, balance-sheet synchronization, which has not been addressed by the
OLA or the Dodd-Frank regulatory response more generally, remains as a potent threat to
systemic stability.
117 See generally Lissa Lamkin Broome, The Dodd-Frank Act: TARP Bailout Backlash
and Too Big To Fail, 15 N.C. BANK. INST. 69 (2011) (describing the backlash against the
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spite its unpopularity among the public, policymakers recognized that the
subprime crisis was fundamentally one of insolvency: the value of so-called
“toxic” assets such as subprime mortgage-backed securities was signifi-
cantly depressed. Indeed, Lehman Brothers was found to have been over $30
billion insolvent as of September 8, 2008, one week before its bankruptcy
filing.118
In short, when financial institutions interlock their destinies by holding
assets with a high degree of correlation conditional on a crisis occurring or
otherwise serving as creditor counterparties to each other, the financial sys-
tem is exposed to the risk that a decline in one firm’s assets will prompt a
cascading wave of insolvency in the sector. In the 2008 crisis, the TARP
bailout saved the sector from a wave of cascading insolvency that would
have brought global economic ruin. But bailouts are not inevitable: it is pos-
sible to prevent correlated insolvency through anti-herding prudential regu-
lation that prevents financial institutions from pooling well before the point
of collective failure.
We suggest that an anti-herding policy of inducing separating equilibria
should inform the development of macroprudential regulatory policy for fi-
nancial institutions. Balance-sheet correlation is a case of pooling equilibria,
albeit one that is more difficult to detect than in the consumer setting be-
cause of the conditional nature of the similarity. Unlike consumers, banks
and financial institutions invest in a wide variety of assets, implying that at
least nominally, no bank is pooling all of its assets in one type of investment.
But assets that are seemingly unconditionally unrelated (that is, on average)
can suddenly move in lockstep when a crisis occurs. Holding such assets
leads essentially to the inverse of the conditional probability benefit of sepa-
rating equilibria we discussed previously: instead of diversity functioning as
stability-enhancing “insurance” for an unexpected shock, institutions can
exploit conditional correlation to synchronize the effects of an unexpected
shock, ensuring that a crisis collectively and simultaneously plunges an en-
tire sector into balance-sheet insolvency.
Indeed, reducing insolvency-derived systemic risk necessitates pruden-
tial regulation aimed specifically at preventing conditional synchronization
in financial institutions’ outcomes. Since the 2008 to 2009 crisis, there has
been a wealth of economic and financial literature specifically addressing
this challenge. In the following subsection, we draw on this literature and
outline a proposal for prudential regulators to induce separation in the four
“L”s of financial crises: leverage, liquidity, losses, and linkages.
Troubled Asset Relief Program and the development of the orderly liquidation authority in
response).
118 Report of Examiner Anton R. Valukas at 1579–80, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings
Inc., No. 08–13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010).
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2. Inducing Separation in the “L”s of Financial Crises
In a leading article on systemic risk in the financial sector, Monica
Billio et al. define the “four ‘L’s of financial crises” as “leverage, liquidity,
losses, and linkages.”119 While each of these has been the subject of exten-
sive literature in economics and finance, little attention has been paid to the
implications of a legal regulatory paradigm that permits the emergence of
excessive pooling equilibria.
A particularly simple, straightforward application of inducing separa-
tion in the financial regulatory setting is leverage. The intuition is straight-
forward: just as Ayres and Mitts argued with respect to homeowners and the
housing market, excessive clustering of banks with high levels of leverage
exposes proportionately more institutions to insolvency in the event of a
fixed shock than if their leverage levels were distributed over a wider spec-
trum. Surprisingly, this aspect of balance sheet regulation has been largely
omitted by the regulatory response to the financial crisis of 2008 to 2009.
In the wake of the crisis, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
developed the Basel III capital standards, which impose uniform leverage
requirements for banks at the international level.120 The Basel III capital
standards are complex but essentially can be distilled down to two central
requirements. First, a financial institution’s total capital may not fall below
eight percent of its risk-weighted assets.121 Second, banks are subject to an
overall non-risk-based leverage ratio which serves as a “backstop” to the
risk-weighted capital framework.122 The bulk of the Basel III rules supply a
detailed definition of what qualifies as capital to satisfy the risk-weighted
and leverage ratio buffer requirements.123
But the Basel III capital standards dedicate comparatively little discus-
sion to the risk of correlated failure and cascading default from proportion-
ately greater exposure to a given shock. The rules impose an “asset-value
correlation multiplier for large financial institutions,” but this consists solely
of a capital surcharge computed from a “probability of default” estimated by
a simulated downturn.124 We support requiring higher capital for a higher
estimated overall probability of default, but this capital surcharge does not
directly address the risk of correlated failure among financial institutions.
In our view, macroprudential regulation of bank capital should incorpo-
rate a policy of inducing separation in bank leverage levels. Similar to Ayres
119 Monica Billio et al., Econometric Measures Of Connectedness and Systemic Risk in the
Finance and Insurance Sectors, 104 J. FIN. ECON. 535, 537 (2012).
120 BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BASEL III: A GLOBAL REGULATORY
FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS, Dec. 2010 (rev. June
2011), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf.
121 Id. § 50.
122 Id. § 152.
123 See, e.g., id. § 52 (defining “Common Equity Tier 1 capital”).
124 See id. § 272 (adding multiplier of 1.25 to a “correlation parameter” which is solely a
function of a firm’s estimated “probability of default”).
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and Mitts’s proposal to regulate the distribution of home equity among
homeowners,125 we propose that prudential regulators cap the proportion of
financial institutions at specified leverage levels so as to reduce the likeli-
hood of simultaneous default under a given shock. Much like the licenses
they propose for the mortgage setting, these “leverage licenses” could be
tradable to maximize efficiency. Some institutions could purchase the oppor-
tunity to lever up and make a high-stakes bet, but this would necessarily
imply a corresponding reduction in the amount of leverage elsewhere in the
system.
More generally, such an approach reflects the key intuition that Ayres
and Mitts emphasize in the mortgage setting: what matters is not the binary
existence of excessive risk but the distribution of that risk across contracts.
Some level of risk-taking—even beyond the Basel III minimum capital ra-
tios—may spur economic growth. A binary, one-size-fits-all regulatory
mandate induces a type of excessive pooling, depriving society of the bene-
fits from a small quantity of risky contracting. The failure of a single highly
leveraged bank—even a large one—would not necessarily endanger stability
of the financial system were it the only one to fail. Similarly, if all banks
respond to the current Basel III proposal by pooling at the 8% risk-weighted
capital level, the entire banking system would be exposed to the possibility
that 8% may not be enough. As we have emphasized throughout this Article,
inducing separating equilibria insures against the possibility that today’s reg-
ulatory response may be insufficient for tomorrow’s crisis.
These principles apply similarly to the regulation of liquidity levels
among financial institutions. In January 2013, the Basel Committee issued a
revised rule on liquidity, which mandates that financial institutions hold a
minimum Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), increasing gradually from 60%
to 100% over the years 2015 to 2019.126 The LCR consists of the value of so-
called “high-quality liquid assets” as a percentage of monthly net cash out-
flows.127 These minimum liquidity levels are intended to ensure that banks
will not face a systemic liquidity shortfall in the next crisis.
However, just as with bank capital, the liquidity provisions are binary,
one-size-fits-all standards, applying identically to all financial institutions. It
is hardly certain that the 100% LCR will be sufficient for the next crisis,
which might require 200% of net cash outflows in liquid assets. The Basel
Committee was rightly concerned with balancing bank profitability against
systemic stability—indeed, it emphasized that the incremental approach is
“designed to ensure that the LCR can be introduced without material disrup-
tion to the orderly strengthening of banking systems or the ongoing financ-
125 See Ayres & Mitts, supra note 24, at 11. R
126 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, BASEL III: THE LIQUIDITY COVERAGE RA-
TIO AND LIQUIDITY RISK MONITORING TOOLS § 10 (2013), available at http://www.bis.org/
publ/bcbs238.pdf.
127 Id. § 17.
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ing of economic activity.”128 But a uniform rule is inevitably over- and
under-inclusive, likely slowing economic growth in exchange for a false
sense of security that a 100% LCR is a guarantee against future liquidity
shortages.
We suggest that financial regulators induce separating equilibria in the
distribution of liquidity rather than rely on a single minimum liquidity ratio.
A combination of menus and direct economic incentives might be well
suited for this setting. For example, every month regulators could let firms
choose from a set of minimum LCRs such as 50%, 100%, and 200%, with
higher levels costing more than lower ones. Using data on a firm’s net cash
outflows, regulators could track the overall distribution of illiquidity among
financial institutions and modify the menu choices as well as the cost of each
choice each month. Diversity in the distribution of LCRs would bring soci-
ety the benefit of lower liquidity requirements for some financial institutions
while ensuring that others are subject to even higher levels so as to insure
against the possibility that a specific level—such as 100%—is insufficient
for the next crisis. Finally, a similar approach would be effective for the last
two “L”s of financial crises: losses and linkages, as we explain in the fol-
lowing section.
3. Reducing Conditional Asset Correlations with CoVaR
We suggest licensing the distribution of bank assets, not merely capital
levels, using the “CoVaR” measure developed by Tobias Adrian and Markus
K. Brunnermeier.129 Adrian and Brunnermeier define CoVaR as “marginal
contribution of a particular institution (in a non-causal sense) to the overall
systemic risk.”130 This can be stated in algebraic terms as the value-at-risk
“of institution j (or the financial system) conditional on some event  of
institution i,” so that CoVaR is “implicitly defined by the q-quantile of the
conditional probability distribution:”131
In other words, CoVaR is the maximum amount that institution j (which
could also be the financial system as a whole) may lose with probability q
conditional on event  happening to institution i.132
128 Id. § 10.
129 Tobias Adrian & Markus K. Brunnermeier, CoVaR 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 17454, 2011), http://www.nber.org/papers/w17454.
130 Id. They also explain that “under many distributional assumptions . . . the CoVaR of an
institution is proportional to the covariance of the financial system and the individual institu-
tion.” Id.
131 Id. at 7.
132 To measure CoVaR, prudential regulators could utilize the measure developed by
Monica Billio et al., who use principal component analysis of financial returns and Granger-
causality tests to “gauge the degree of connectedness of the financial system.” Bilio et al.,
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To understand how CoVaR operates, imagine that event  is an un-
expected decline in the value of an asset held by institution i. This definition
implies that the financial system will lose at most a certain amount, given by
CoVaR, with probability q. Imagine, for example, that the event is an unex-
pected decline in the value of home mortgage securities held by institution i.
CoVaR supplies an “upper bound” for the financial system’s probabilistic
loss upon this event occurring to institution i (for example, a loss of $100
million with 50% probability, $200 million with 25% probability, and so
forth). Accordingly, CoVaR indicates the degree to which a specific institu-
tion’s fate is interlinked with that of the financial system as a whole: if the
system is largely unaffected by events occurring to institution i, CoVaR is
minimal. CoVaR thus supplies a formal definition of systemic risk as the
conditional correlation of asset returns of the financial system in response to
events affecting individual firms within it.
Adrian and Brunnermeier provide two useful examples of estimating
and applying CoVaR. The first is a plot of CoVaR against VaR (value-at-
risk) for fourteen leading financial institutions. VaR measures the uncondi-
tional risk of a particular firm, specifically the 1% quantile of a firm’s return
distribution, in other words, a “worst case” tail event. The DCoVaR measure
therefore represents “the percentage point change in the financial system’s
1% VaR when a particular institution realizes its own 1% VaR.”133
FIGURE 4: COVAR VS. VAR
supra note 119, at 538. Similar to our discussion of conditional probability, Billio et al. note R
that “aggregate correlations may decline in bull markets,” but their measures “show increased
unconditional correlations among certain sectors and financial institutions, yielding finer-grain
snapshots of linkages throughout the financial system.” Id. A licensing regime based on the
econometric measure of Granger-causality network linkage would serve as a mechanism of
implementing CoVaR regulation, for example, by giving prudential regulators the ability to
directly restrict the level of interconnectedness that leads to correlated failure among banks.
133 Adrian & Brunnermeier, supra note 125, at 3.
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Consider an example: AIG was among the least risky firms in terms of un-
conditional risk. It stood to lose only about 7.5% in the “worst case” scena-
rio as represented by the 1% quantile, but had the second highest CoVaR in
this group. The 1% quantile of the financial system’s return distribution
would have dropped 5% when AIG alone lost relatively little. On the other
hand, Wells Fargo & Company (“WFC”), which emerged relatively un-
scathed from the financial crisis even after acquiring Wachovia,134 had ap-
proximately the same VaR as AIG but the lowest CoVaR of the group.
As a second example, Adrian and Brunnermeier show how CoVaR in
the future may be estimated as a countercyclical measure that can detect
systemic risk as it accumulates, which is the focus of this Article. They de-
velop a two-year “forward DCoVaR” measure using data from all publicly
traded financial institutions and show how it was a better predictor of the
financial crisis than a contemporaneous alternative.135
In our view, forward CoVaR is a particularly useful measure for regula-
tory policy because it provides a predictive quantitative measure for the con-
ditional correlation that can result from herding. For example, prudential
regulators could directly utilize forward CoVaR to reduce asset herding on
bank balance sheets. The Federal Reserve could issue 1000 forward CoVaR
licenses with each license corresponding to the permissible holding of $1
million in assets at 1.0 forward CoVaR. An institution would thus require
one license for every $10 million in assets at a forward CoVaR of 0.10. The
initial 1000 allocation would be auctioned to institutions and tradable on a
secondary market. This causes licenses to gravitate towards firms that highly
value holding a higher proportion of assets with performance correlated with
that of other firms while forcing other firms to diversify, thereby restricting
the overall level of CoVaR within the market. By setting a hard cap on firms’
correlation with the financial system as a whole, a licensing scheme would
directly prevent correlated declines in asset values across financial
institutions.136
Alternatively, regulators could impose a corrective CoVaR tax. A com-
prehensive evaluation of how to compute such a tax would require identify-
ing the precise social cost of conditional synchronization, which is beyond
the scope of this Article. But we suggest a few intuitions. Some level of
CoVaR is undoubtedly desirable, because completely uncorrelated asset
134 See, e.g., Wells Fargo: 2 Upside Catalysts, SEEKING ALPHA (Mar. 4, 2013), http://
seekingalpha.com/article/1242871-wells-fargo-2-huge-upside-catalysts (“Wells Fargo (WFC)
has enjoyed a well-deserved reputation on Wall Street as a very strong, conservative bank that
came through the financial crisis virtually unscathed and stronger than ever.”).
135 Adrian & Brunnermeier, supra note 125, at 23–24.
136 For a discussion of the implementation issues that may arise with this licensing system,
see our detailed proposal to license mortgage equity in Ayres & Mitts, supra note 8, at 130–31. R
Many of the principles that we articulated in the mortgage context (for example, licensing
based on geographic area, instituting monitoring systems to keep regulators up to date, and
tailoring licenses to underserved communities to promote distributional policy goals) would
apply in these settings as well.
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portfolios would likely lead to suboptimal underinvestment. However, the
social cost of synchronization is likely greater at higher levels of CoVaR.
Accordingly, we suggest that any such tax be nonlinear in nature: at small
levels of CoVaR, no tax would be imposed, but at greater levels, the tax
would increase significantly. This would reduce the likelihood of synchro-
nized failure en masse while still allowing firms to maintain basic invest-
ment portfolios that have some level of interconnectedness.
A third alternative to licensing or taxation is to indirectly reduce CoVaR
by issuing regulatory variances for differential disclosure and transparency.
For example, regulators could randomly allocate “opacity privileges” that
would grant financial institutions one-time exemptions from public reporting
requirements. Reducing transparency in a controlled and targeted manner
would permit banks to peruse idiosyncratic investment strategies that are
harder for counterparties to mimic. The selective concealment of asset port-
folios gives regulators the ability to indirectly induce greater variation in
conditional asset returns and thereby reduce CoVaR across the financial sys-
tem as a whole.
CoVaR is a powerful measure to induce separation and reduce herding
among financial institution asset portfolios. But the intuitions behind CoVaR
are not limited to bank balance sheets. CoVaR can be utilized in additional
areas of regulatory policy such as consumer finance and corporate and secur-
ities law to combat the emergence of herding and induce beneficial separa-
tion. In the following sections, we discuss these applications of reducing
conditional correlation in other settings.
B. Consumer Finance
1. Enhancing Systemic Stability: CoVaR for Consumer Debt
Just as with financial institutions, CoVaR can be employed to counter-
act the externality of excessive herding on consumer balance sheets. Such
pooling arises when consumers find it individually rational to engage in eco-
nomic activity that is conditionally correlated, making it more likely that an
unexpected adverse event will impose external costs on society. The most
straightforward example is debt-to-income (DTI) ratios. When consumers
pool at the same debt level as a proportion of income, a given decline in
income levels (for example, due to rising unemployment) exposes more con-
sumers to the risk of being unable to service their debt. The externality in
this case is the effect of deleveraging on the broader economy: consumers’
inability to service debt can lead to the imposition of losses on creditors, as
well as on other sectors of the economy that depend on consumer spending.
In other words, DTI herding implies greater correlation of detrimental
outcomes conditional on a given proportional decline in income. This corre-
lation can be stated, in terms of the definition of CoVaR, as an increased
amount that other consumers, creditors, and the financial system j will
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probabilistically lose in response to an adverse event occurring to consumer
i. And, just as in the banking context, the quantitative nature of CoVaR per-
mits regulatory intervention to cap this conditional correlation.
To be sure, licensing or taxing CoVaR in the consumer setting is more
difficult than in the banking context because unlike financial institutions,
consumers are not subject to continuous prudential regulation and oversight.
However, tracking consumer DTI levels is not technically infeasible. The
information is already available in income tax filings and credit reports. The
federal government already has access to income tax returns, and with ap-
propriate statutory authority, regulators could simply use the prior year’s ad-
justed gross income (AGI) as a rough proxy for current income. AGI would
be an imperfect measure, as some individuals have access to income that is
not reported under AGI (for example, adult children living with their par-
ents), but it would likely capture the vast majority of the population. We are
not suggesting that any individually identifying information would be uti-
lized; CoVaR could be calculated using data aggregated by geographic re-
gion, age, or occupation.137
Credit reporting would function in a similar manner. Congress might
simply mandate that the major credit-reporting bureaus report aggregate debt
data to a financial regulator such as the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau (CFPB), which would compute approximate DTI levels from the prior
year’s income. While linking individual debt levels to AGI would likely
prove problematic for privacy reasons, it is only necessary to have sufficient
granularity in the reporting level. For example, if the CFPB were to compute
that consumer debt is herding at a DTI of 30% among 18 to 25 year olds in
the construction industry, it might mandate that credit-card issuers charge
higher interest levels for customers aged 18 to 25 in the construction indus-
try with a DTI in excess of 25%.
2. Informational Benefits of Separation in Consumer Finance
In addition to enhancing stability, inducing separating equilibria in con-
sumer finance would provide substantial informational benefits. Extensive
literature on behavioral biases in consumer contracting has shown that con-
sumers systematically fail to fully maximize utility as predicted by rational
actor theory.138 Writing on the prevalence of industry exploitation of con-
137 Occupational data might be the most useful for anticipating the propensity of individu-
als to be exposed to a common shock to the labor markets.
138 The literature on this topic is vast. For leading examples of general scholarship, see,
e.g., RICHARD L. OLIVER, SATISFACTION: A BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE CONSUMER
(2nd ed. 2010); BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein, ed., 2000); Christine
Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50
STANFORD L. REV. 1471 (1998); Daniel Kahneman, Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology
for Behavioral Economics, 5 AM. ECON. REV. 1449 (2003); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S.
Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Eco-
nomics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051 (2000).
\\jciprod01\productn\H\HLB\5-1\HLB102.txt unknown Seq: 40 18-FEB-15 11:06
40 Harvard Business Law Review [Vol. 5
sumer biases in the credit-card market, Oren Bar-Gill notes that “competi-
tive forces compel sellers to take advantage of consumer weaknesses.”139
Bar-Gill suggests various consumer-protection policy proposals such as bet-
ter ex ante regulation with warnings, disclosures, and default rules, as well
as active judicial review under the doctrines of unconscionability, penalty,
and bankruptcy law.140
However, a primary critique of behavioral economics is that the distri-
bution of biases in the population is unknown. Richard Epstein, for example,
has emphasized that “no consumer wears a black or white hat that indicates
his or her [type of bias] . . . the behavioral critique loses much of its bite,
because it can no longer predict any systematic direction to the market er-
rors.”141 But it is precisely this problem of obtaining information as to the
distribution of biases in the population that separating equilibria can solve.
Variation in the types of consumer contracts permits regulators to make com-
parative inferences regarding the likelihood of behavioral biases.
As a concrete example, consider the regulation of warnings and disclo-
sure in consumer financial transactions. It is unclear what type of disclosure
is most effective at reducing consumer biases. In 1968, the Truth in Lending
Act was enacted under a paradigm of “more is better”—greater quantity of
disclosure was assumed to lead to more informed and ultimately more ra-
tional decision-making.142 Writing one decade later, two law professors
noted that this approach had led to numerous problems: “[C]onsumers and
creditors alike claim[ ] that disclosure statements are unnecessarily com-
plex, and a steady stream of litigation [is] flowing.”143
Ever since, scholars have debated simplification in credit-disclosure
statements to consumers.144 The CFPB recently proposed a vastly simpler
disclosure form for home mortgage transactions consisting of basic terms
such as the loan amount, interest rate, estimated monthly payment for differ-
ent groups of years, and cash required to close.145 But simplification alone is
hardly a panacea: the portions omitted may be critical for an adequate under-
139 Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction by Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373 (2004).
140 Id. at 1373–1427.
141 Richard A. Epstein, Behavioral Economics: Human Errors and Market Corrections,
73 U. CHI. L. REV. 111, 121 (2006).
142 See, e.g., Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2009) (“It is the purpose of this
subchapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer will be able
to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed
use of credit, and to protect the consumer against inaccurate and unfair credit billing and credit
card practices.”).
143 Jonathan M. Landers & Ralph J. Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26
UCLA L. REV. 711, 712 (1978).
144 See, e.g., Jeffrey Davis, Protecting Consumers from Overdisclosure and Gobbledy-
gook: An Empirical Look at the Simplification of Consumer-Credit Contracts, 63 VA. L. REV.
841 (1977); David M. Grether, Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Irrelevance of Information
Overload: An Analysis of Search and Disclosure, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 277 (1986).
145 Integrated Mortgage Disclosures under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act
(Regulation X) and the Truth In Lending Act (Regulation Z), 77 Fed. Reg. 51116 (Aug. 23,
2012). For a visual example of the CFPB’s proposed form, see Know Before You Owe, CON-
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standing of the risks of the transaction. It is difficult to believe that the
CFPB just happened to discover the optimal mix of disclosure that will pro-
vide the maximum amount of bias reduction.
More fundamentally, the optimal level of disclosure may be heteroge-
neous among the borrower population. It likely varies with borrowers’ edu-
cation levels, socioeconomic conditions, and other unobservable
characteristics. The optimal regulatory policy for disclosure may likewise be
heterogeneous: different forms for different types of borrowers or borrowing
situations. Indeed, Ian Ayres and Alan Schwartz recently argued that con-
sumer protection law should focus on unexpected, unfavorable terms and
that “sellers could enforce unexpected, unfavorable terms only if they are
disclosed in a ‘warning box’ that has a government-provided standard bor-
der.”146 The idea is that to be effective, consumer protection law may need to
be heterogeneous in nature, applying differentially to different types of
terms. In a similar vein, Ariel Porat and Lior Jacob Strahilevitz recently ar-
gued that the emergence of “big data” should render legal rules “personal-
ized,” meaning heterogeneously adapted to individual traits and
characteristics.147 They specifically identify consumer protection law as a
natural candidate for personalized default rules, such as where an efficient
minoritarian default rule of “delivery at the buyer’s residence” might apply
to medical equipment stores with a large number of disabled customers.148
We build on these insights and suggest that inducing separation in the
regulation of consumer financial transactions is the key to empirical discov-
ery of which forms of disclosure are more effective than others under vary-
ing conditions. When combined with random assignment, the experimental
nature of this approach would permit causal inference as to the long-term
effectiveness of varying types of disclosure. For example, regulators could
randomly assign varying types of disclosure forms and compare default rates
several years later to determine which is more effective.
But variation can also facilitate the implementation of heterogeneous
policy as an end unto itself. Similar to Ayres and Schwartz’s proposal to
limit unenforceability to a subset of terms—those which are unexpected and
unfavorable—we suggest that in addition to searching for the “best” form of
disclosure, variation in disclosure requirements would facilitate learning of
the conditional payoffs, which are often unknown yet of great importance.
These conditions include types of borrowers and circumstances of the trans-
action at the time of borrowing—for example, certain forms of disclosure
may be effective with borrowers of different socioeconomic or educational
SUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/knowbeforeyou
owe/ (last visited May 11, 2013).
146 Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66
STAN. L. REV. 545, 545 (2014).
147 Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default Rules and Disclosure with
Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417 (2014).
148 Id. at 1442.
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backgrounds, or for interest-only as opposed to variable-rate loans—as well
as unknown future events such as macroeconomic downturns. The latter is
especially important because the next crisis may impact borrowers differ-
ently in ways that we cannot foresee today. A regulatory policy of inducing
variation to preserve knowledge as to the conditional payoffs of various
forms of regulation provides society with the informational benefit of infer-
ence as to the conditional effectiveness of different types of disclosure.
C. Securities Regulation
A third area that would benefit from a regulatory policy of inducing
separating equilibria is securities regulation. Since their inception, securities
laws have been characterized by mandatory rules that apply equally to all
issuers, despite the inefficiencies inherent in a one-size-fits-all regime.
Scholars have repeatedly criticized this approach in contexts ranging from
mandatory disclosure under the Williams Act to the prohibition on trading
on material nonpublic information. In 1987, Jonathan R. Macey and Jeffrey
M. Netter argued that “no one has ever explained why target firms could not
themselves provide incentives for bidders to disclose the information re-
quired by the Williams Act if such disclosure would benefit shareholders.”149
Roberta Romano has penned an extensive critique of the mandatory,
“one-size-fits-all” system of federal securities regulation.150 She shows that
there is little empirical evidence that the mandatory disclosure imposed by
the federal securities laws produces net benefits that exceed costs or that
adequate information would not be produced for investors in the absence of
such compulsory disclosure.151 Moreover, Romano emphasizes, there is am-
ple evidence that state competition for corporate charters has led to legal
regimes that are efficient and maximize shareholder value. Accordingly, Ro-
mano calls for a market approach to securities regulation whereby firms may
choose the state to register their securities and thereby “opt in” to that state’s
disclosure laws.152 Alternatively, Romano advocates making the federal se-
curities laws a “default” regime, giving firms the option to choose whether
to comply. Such an approach would lack the benefits of state competition
149 Jonathan R. Macey & Jeffry M. Netter, Regulation 13D and the Regulatory Process, 65
WASH. U. L.Q. 131, 154 (1987). Ian Ayres and Steven Choi have similarly argued that firms
should be able to permit so-called “outsider trading” by informed outsiders such as market
analysts through an opt-out mechanism consisting of the approval of “both a majority of a
firm’s board and a majority of a firm’s shareholders.” Ian Ayres & Stephen Choi, Internalizing
Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REV. 313, 389 (2002).
150 Roberta Romano, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation,
107 YALE L.J. 2359 (1998).
151 Id. at 2373.
152 Id. at 2362.
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but still allow firms and investors to decide whether the securities laws are
value maximizing.153
Romano’s market-based proposal for securities regulation reflects the
anti-herding regulatory paradigm we have advocated throughout this Article.
Permitting states to compete for firms’ securities registration would provide
the informational benefit of diversity, for example, by learning which set of
disclosure rules promotes efficiency and greater shareholder value creation
on average.154 Even a federal default rule with firm-specific opt-out would
facilitate comparative inference as to whether compliance with the federal
securities laws is associated with higher shareholder value. Unfortunately,
the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC) has not utilized its exemptive
authority to enable any sort of experimentation regarding which disclosure
laws would be most value maximizing.
Scholars have also criticized the mandatory nature of the securities laws
in light of the recent controversy over reforming the ten-day filing window
for the acquisition of beneficial ownership under Section 13(d) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934.155 Joshua Mitts has argued that the SEC should
permit firms to balance the costs and benefits of shareholder activism and
the stealth acquisition of shares by opting for a firm-specific disclosure win-
dow through a shareholder amendment to the corporate bylaws.156 This is
similar to an approach advocated by Luca Enriques, Matteo Gargantini &
Valerio Novembre, who suggest that the European Commission permit
shareholder disclosure opt -out of varying durations both by member states
and specific firms.157 Alternatively, Steven Brams and Joshua Mitts have
suggested a more radical but more efficient case-by-case transactional mech-
anism whereby stealth acquirers purchase specific-disclosure delays through
an asynchronous bargaining mechanism.158
153 Id. at 2396. This argument has been echoed by Alan Palmiter, who dedicated an entire
article to issuer choice in securities offerings. Alan R. Palmiter, Toward Disclosure Choice in
Securities Offerings, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1 (1999).
154 In a similar vein, Roberta Romano more recently called for greater diversity in the
regulatory regimes applying to financial institutions. Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the
International Regulation of Financial Institutions: Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Ar-
chitecture 3 (Yale Law & Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 452, 2013), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2127749 (calling for “a more flexible financial
architecture that provides greater room for regulatory diversity and experimentation, given the
uncertain and dynamic environment in which financial institutions operate”). This differs from
our discussion of balance-sheet herding in the banking setting but is an important complemen-
tary application of anti-herding principles to financial regulation more generally.
155 See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk & Robert J. Jackson Jr., The Law and Economics of
Blockholder Disclosure, 2 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 39, 46 (2012); Letter from Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec’y, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 3 (Mar. 7, 2011),
available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2011/petn4-624.pdf.
156 Joshua Mitts, A Private Ordering Solution to Blockholder Disclosure, 35 N.C. CENT.
L. REV 203, 239 (2013).
157 Luca Enriques, Matteo Gargantini & Valerio Novembre, Mandatory and Contract-
Based Shareholding Disclosure, 25 UNIF. L. REV. 713, 736 (2010).
158 Steven Brams & Joshua Mitts, Law and Mechanism Design: Procedures to Induce
Honest Bargaining, 68 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 729, 783 (2013).
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We echo these calls for a more efficient, nonmandatory securities regu-
lation regime, but in our view, separation is desirable for the additional rea-
sons we have outlined in this Article. In particular, inducing diversity in the
distribution of rules under the securities laws would have substantial infor-
mational benefits. For example, the SEC could subsidize the adoption of
varying beneficial ownership disclosure windows under Section 13(d) to ob-
tain empirical data regarding which durations are value maximizing for dif-
ferent types and sizes of firms. A similar approach could be taken with
insider and outsider trading: the SEC could issue a limited quantity of vari-
ances to empirically experiment with the tradeoff between adverse-selection
effects and for allowing informed trading as a form of compensation.159 In
short, securities regulation seems well suited for the informational benefits
of a regulatory policy of inducing separating equilibria.
V. CONCLUSION: THE PARABLE OF THE BRIDGES
On April 16, 1850, the Angers Bridge collapsed while a battalion of
French soldiers was marching across it.160 The collapse occurred during a
powerful storm with high winds, but even though the soldiers had been or-
dered to break step during the crossing, a commission found that a contribut-
ing cause for the collapse was that the soldiers unconsciously matched the
cadence of their step to the initial oscillations induced by the wind.161 A
similar unconscious parallelism was found in England 150 years later:
Soon after the crowd streamed on to London’s Millennium Bridge
on the day it opened, the bridge started to sway from side to side:
many pedestrians fell spontaneously into step with the bridge’s vi-
brations, inadvertently amplifying them.162
Synchronous marching can thus deleteriously amplify the natural oscilla-
tions of a bridge. Viewed through the lens of herding, the soldiers’ marching
is a kind of pooling that amplifies systemic risk. The standard regulatory
remedy of ordering soldiers to break step rests on the idea that, given auton-
omy, the soldiers will march proverbially to different drummers. But the
159 Compare, e.g., Stanislav Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Criti-
cal Evaluation of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 180 (2004), and
Kimberly D. Krawiec, Fairness, Efficiency, and Insider Trading: Deconstructing the Coin of
the Realm in the Information Age, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 443, 469–70 (2001) (arguing that insider
trading should be prohibited), with David D. Haddock & Jonathan R. Macey, A Coasian Model
of Insider Trading, 80 NW. U. L. REV. 1449, 1457 (1986) (advocating for the legalization of
insider trading).
160 See John Surtees & Bill Wolmuth, Crowd-Related Failure of Bridges, 156 PROC. ICE-
CIVIL ENGINEERING 116, 118 (2003).
161 A. DUMAS, ANNALES DES PONTS ET CHAUSSÉES: PARTIE TECHNIQUE 404 (1850) (“le
passage d’un grand nombre de soldats dont la marche devait involontairement devenir
cadencée par l’effet des oscillations du plancher”).
162 Steven H. Strogatz, et al., Crowd Synchrony on the Millennium Bridge, 438 NATURE
43, 43 (2005).
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lesson of the Angers and Millennium bridge histories is that laissez-faire
regulation may not be sufficient to avoid deleterious herding. The uncon-
scious choices of pedestrians and soldiers to match their cadence to the os-
cillations of the bridge can exacerbate the impact of a natural shock.
The parable of the bridges can help us see that “too-big-to-fail”
(TBTF) provisions are laudable but do not go far enough. A large bank can
be thought of (literally) as a large pool of assets—which might imprudently
be overexposed to a particular kind of financial shock. Seen in this light, the
prohibition against TBTF banks can be seen as a kind of anti-pooling regula-
tion—because the regulation sought to stop unhealthy pooling of risk that
could occur inside the portfolio of a single financial behemoth. But critics of
TBTF have correctly pointed out that after breaking up or shrinking the size
of the large banks, there is nothing in current regulation to stop smaller
banks from herding and replicating any aggregate position of the larger
banks. The hope of TBTF is that smaller banks will naturally make diverse
investment decisions and consequently produce less pooling equilibria But
the parable of the bridges illustrates that laissez-faire regulation may not be
sufficient to deter deleterious herding. Merely not mandating uniformity
may be sufficient. At times it may be appropriate to mandate (or actively
encourage) nonuniformity.
As we have shown, a particularly effective means of inducing separa-
tion is the CoVaR measure of conditional correlation of asset returns. From
regulating bank balance sheets to debt levels and incorporation, regulators
can utilize the CoVaR measure to cap the synchronized failure that renders a
financial system vulnerable to an unexpected shock. Anti-herding policies
can be extended to other regulatory settings as well. There has been an ex-
tensive debate recently over whether the minimum length of law school
should be two years instead of three.163 But why not a menu of different
durations to encourage experimentation with which duration is optimal for
different socioeconomic groups in various geographical regions? More
broadly, the informational benefits of diversity imply that an effective policy
solution might involve a basket of options rather than a single choice that is
“better” than the others. We could imagine any number of contexts—gov-
ernance systems, treaty regimes, educational systems—where a one-size-
fits-all paradigm prevents society from discovering better alternatives.164
163 See, e.g., Debra Cassens Weiss, Two-Year Law School Was a Good Idea in 1970, and
It’s a Good Idea Now, Prof Tells ABA Task Force, ABA JOURNAL (Feb. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/two-year_law_school_was_a_good_idea_in_1970_
and_its_a_good_idea_now/.
164 Indeed, one more reason to institute anti-herding regulation is that a regulatory policy
may unexpectedly fail when tomorrow’s society differs from today’s. Government subsidies for
homeownership were essential for debt-averse post-Depression America but far from optimal
in the mid-2000s housing bubble when flipping houses became in vogue. Compare Robert E.
Lang & Rebecca R. Sohmer, Legacy of the Housing Act of 1949: The Past, Present, and
Future of Federal Housing and Urban Policy, 11 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 291, 295 (2000)
(“Title II dramatically increased the availability of FHA mortgage insurance and fueled a
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In short, we suggest that the lesson of the Angers Bridge is not only that
the aggregation of individually beneficial activities can lead to socially detri-
mental outcomes. The deeper point is that excessive synchronization itself
can be dangerous—without the cacophony of diversity we just might find an
otherwise safe bridge collapsing beneath us. But there is also an independent
benefit to anti-herding regulation: policies that induce separation can give
society insights into not only the world we live in today, but also the world
we might unexpectedly encounter tomorrow.
postwar boom in housing construction and homeownership.”) (citing Sylvia C. Martinez, The
Housing Act of 1949: Its Place in the Realization of the American Dream of Homeownership,
11 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 467, 471–76 (2000)), with Andrew Haughwout et al., Real Estate
Investors, the Leverage Cycle, and the Housing Market Crisis, Fed. Res. Bank. N.Y. Staff
Report No. 514 (Sept. 2011), at 10, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs
tract_id=1926858 (discussing the dramatic increase in the 2000s of so-called buy-and-flip
investors who are “portrayed in the popular television show ‘Flip This House’”). In a recent
empirical project, Joshua Mitts demonstrates a predictive approach to regulation using large-
scale textual data on social trends. Joshua Mitts, Predictive Regulation (June 27, 2014) (unpub-
lished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2411816.
However, the key to adaptable regulation is ensuring sufficient diversity in the distribution of
policy so that government can nimbly respond to social changes without the “ratchet effect” of
being locked in to a one-size-fits-all approach.
